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We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show
that the players begin to invest eﬀort only shortly before the time limit when
the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team
can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show that
the second-best optimal contract is discriminatory. We investigate how limited
liability or the threat of sabotage inﬂuences the team’s problem. It is further
shown that players who earn higher wages can be worse oﬀ than teammates with
lower wages and that present-biased preferences can mitigate procrastination.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, L22, J71, M52.
Keywords: moral hazard, team production, partnerships, procrastination, con-
tract design, discrimination.
1 INTRODUCTION
Team production is widely used in organizations (Katzenbach and Smith 1993) and
it has become increasingly important over the last decades (Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi
2007). A common problem of team production is that individual contributions cannot
be identiﬁed, which causes moral hazard (Holmstr¨ om 1982, Prendergast 1999).
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This paper contributes to the understanding of the dynamic aspects of moral
hazard in teams. We examine how the externalities from team production induce
not only static, but also rich dynamic eﬀects. We consider a simple model where a
team, consisting of perfectly rational and time-consistent players, works on a joint
task, which yields a reward when solved.1
Our ﬁrst result is that when the reward is shared equally among players and
the time limit for solving the task is suﬃciently long, the team procrastinates in the
sense that members invest eﬀort only shortly before the time limit. Consider a simple
example with two players, who have two periods to solve a task. The task is solved in
a period with probabilities 1/2, 1/4, or 0 when respectively both, one, or no player(s)
invest(s) eﬀort in this period. Eﬀort causes private costs of 1. Solving the task yields
a per-capita reward of 5. In period 2, a player’s additional expected payoﬀ from
investing is 1/4 × 5 − 1 > 0. Hence, both players invest eﬀort, conditional that the
task is not yet solved. The expected payoﬀ from period 2 is 1/2×5−1 = 3/2 when the
task is not yet solved and zero otherwise. In period 1, a player’s additional expected
payoﬀ from investing is 1/4 × (5 − 3/2) − 1 < 0. Thus, players do not invest in
period 1. The key intuition is that team production in the future causes externalities
which make investing eﬀort in the present less worthwhile. Procrastination is socially
ineﬃcient, but individually rational.2
As a benchmark case, we consider the game with a single player. Because the
externalities from team production are absent the player does not procrastinate.
Consider the example from before. The player invests in period 2 (conditional that
the task is not yet solved) because the additional expected payoﬀ from investing is
1/4×5−1 > 0. The expected payoﬀ from period 2 is 1/4×5−1 = 1/4 when the task
is not yet solved. The player also invests in period 1 because the additional expected
payoﬀ from investing is 1/4 × (5 − 1/4) − 1 > 0.
Motivated by the ﬁnding that a team may procrastinate when players are remu-
1See Cohen and Bailey (1997) for examples how organizations use so called project teams, which
are usually time-limited and non-repetitive (p. 242).
2O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) deﬁne procrastination as“wait when you should do it”(p. 104).
In the example, if both players invest also in period 1, the team’s expected payoﬀ is 1/2 × 10 − 2 +
1/2 × 3 = 9/2 instead of just 2 × 3/2 = 3 when players procrastinate.3
nerated equally, we explore how the team can design a wage contract that mitigates
procrastination. Our investigation primarily concerns two questions: which eﬀort
proﬁle is implemented, and what contract leads to its implementation? While eﬀort
is noncontractible, we allow the team to condition each player’s wage in each period
on whether the task is solved or not. We require that the team’s budget is balanced,
which can be understood as a consequence of feasibility and renegotiation-proofness.
We show that when the ﬁrst-best (where all players invest, as long as the task is not
solved) is implementable, one can implement it with the equal-sharing contract, where
all players receive the same share of the team’s reward. When the time limit is suﬃ-
ciently long, we know from before that players procrastinate with the equal-sharing
contract. In this case the ﬁrst-best is not implementable.
We then investigate the properties of second-best contracts. We ﬁrst show that
the equal-sharing contract is not second-best. The idea is that by discriminating
between players (in the sense of remunerating them diﬀerently) one can induce a
player, or some players, to invest eﬀort in an early period, at a time when under the
equal-sharing contract no player would invest. As a general result, we show that a
second-best contract has to be discriminatory. To see that discriminatory contracts
mitigate procrastination in teams, consider again the previous example. Suppose that
when the task is solved in period 1, player 1 receives the team’s reward of 10, while
player 2 receives nothing. When the task is solved in period 2 each player still receives
5. Then player 1 invests eﬀort in period 1 because her additional expected payoﬀ
from investing is 1/4 × (10 − 3/2) − 1 > 0. Player 2 does not invest in period 1 and
(when the task is not solved) both players invest in period 2. By the aforementioned
change of the ﬁrst-period rewards, the team’s expected payoﬀ improves from 3 to
1/4 × 10 − 1 + 3/4 × 3 = 15/4.
We specify a wage contract, called“handsome contract”, which induces all players
except one to invest in early periods (i.e., periods where the team does not invest
with the equal-sharing contract) and all players to invest in late periods. We show
that the handsome contract is second-best and renegotiation-proof. There may also
exist other contracts which are second-best. But when we require the contract to be
renegotiation-proof, all contracts which are second-best implement the same eﬀort
proﬁle (i.e., the same number of players to invest in each period) as the handsome4
contract. We then explore how limited liability or the threat of sabotage restricts
the team’s contract design problem. We show that both issues can seriously limit the
team’s possibilities to mitigate procrastination, especially when there are more than
two players.
Since our model is easily tractable, we can gain several additional insights. First,
when we allow the team to hire a principal the ﬁrst-best can be implemented when
the team members are fully liable. When the team members are protected by limited
liability and the time limit is suﬃciently long, this is no longer true. The idea is that
with a long time limit the wages in early periods have to be huge to convince the
team members to invest eﬀort. The principal would then earn a negative expected
proﬁt, which makes implementing the ﬁrst-best impossible.
Second, discriminatory wage contracts often lead to diﬀerences in players’ well-
being. Interestingly, players who earn higher wages can be worse oﬀ than teammates
with lower wages. The reason is that players with higher wages may be motivated to
invest eﬀort, but teammates with lower wages may not be motivated. Due to team
production, the latter beneﬁt from the formers’ investments, while they do not have
to bear eﬀort costs. This eﬀect can overcompensate the wage diﬀerences. The ﬁnding
has the severe implication that an outside party (e.g., a judge) is in general not able
to infer that player A is disadvantaged compared to B when A receives lower wages
than B.
Third, the model we consider can also be interpreted as a public-good game.
Numerous experiments show that in such games people contribute more than they
should if they were selﬁsh, which indicates that people are often not purely selﬁsh.3
In an extension of our model, we suppose that players have social preferences, in the
sense that they take other players’ well-being (at least partly) into account. We ﬁrst
show that players begin to invest eﬀort earlier than when they are selﬁsh. That is,
procrastination is alleviated by social preferences. Unless players are fully altruistic,
however, the players still procrastinate when rewarded equally and the time limit is
suﬃciently long. We further consider the case where players diﬀer with respect to their
social preferences. For this case it is better to have heterogenous teams (where players
3For stronger evidence, see, for example, Andreoni (1995).5
have diﬀerent social preferences) than having homogenous teams (where players have
the same social preferences).4
Fourth, present-bias preferences can mitigate procrastination. The idea is that
present-biased players put less weight on the future externalities arising from team
production. This insight is highly interesting because many models explain procras-
tination by means of present-bias preferences (e.g., Akerlof 1991, Laibson 1997, and
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001).
Related Literature.— Our paper is related to the huge literature on moral haz-
ard in teams, which is pioneered by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstr¨ om
(1982).5 Most of this literature either considers static models or dynamic models
with a repetition of a one-period game. A remarkable exception is Bonatti and
H¨ orner (forthcoming). Independently of our work, they developed a model where
teams procrastinate. They put a strong emphasize on the eﬀects of uncertainty and
learning (they assume that players do not know the production technology) and show
that observability of eﬀort highly inﬂuences their results. In our model the produc-
tion technology is known6 which has the consequence that it is not important whether
eﬀort is observable or not. Their main interest is the inﬁnity horizon case, where they
characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium when eﬀort costs are linear. We brieﬂy
study the inﬁnite horizon case and are able to characterize the Markov perfect equi-
librium for our model also for the case when eﬀort costs are nonlinear. An interesting
result of our analysis is that a team may beneﬁt from a lower discount factor. Our
main focus, however, is the case with a ﬁnite horizon, where we study in depth the
question how contracts are optimally designed. Contract design is not the focus of
Bonatti and H¨ orner. They brieﬂy study mechanisms for the inﬁnite horizon case and
assume that wages have to be nondiscriminatory.7 As our analysis reveals, discrim-
4Interestingly, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) show empirically that teams which are
more heterogenous with respect to the abilities of their members are more productive.
5We especially contribute to the branch of the literature on moral hazard in teams which explores
optimal sharing rules for teams when there is no principal and the team’s budget has to be balanced;
see Holmstr¨ om (1982), Radner (1986), Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986), Rasmusen (1987),
Legros and Matthews (1993), and Strausz (1999).
6This is in line with most agency models in the literature.
7Another diﬀerence is that they require that the team’s budget has to be balanced only on average6
inatory contracts are key instruments to alleviate procrastination. We also study
how renegotiation-proofness, limited liability, or the threat of sabotage inﬂuences the
team’s design problem. Bonatti and H¨ orner put a strong emphasize on deadlines.
We show that in our model designing a discriminating contract is a better measure
to mitigate procrastination than a deadline, at least when the discount factor is suf-
ﬁciently close to one.8 Because our model allows for a very simple characterization
of the solution, we are able to extend our baseline model in several interesting ways.
Next to the extensive study how contracts are optimally designed, we explore issues
like present-biased preferences and social preferences and team design.
We also contribute to the economic literature on discrimination, which started
with Becker (1957). He argues that market forces are eﬀective means to repress
discrimination because ﬁrms which discriminate are less eﬃcient than those who
do not. A problem with this argument is, however, that it cannot explain why
discrimination persists (Stiglitz 1973, Arrow 1998). In our model discrimination is
necessary to mitigate procrastination in teams and mandatory when implementing
the second-best. Winter (2004) provides a static model of team production with moral
hazard and an increasing returns to scale production technology. His main result is
that when one requires the Nash equilibrium to be unique, the optimal contract is
discriminatory. For surveys, see Darity and Mason (1998) and Holzer and Neumark
(2000, 2006).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model, which is
then analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, we explore how the team can design a wage
contract that mitigates procrastination and study how constraints like renegotiation-
proofness, limited liability, and the threat of sabotage inﬂuences the team’s problem.
We also investigate the case where the team can hire a principal. In Section 5, we
oﬀer some extensions. We conclude in Section 6. Proofs are relegated to Appendix
A.
(which requires a third party).
8Moreover, a problem of deadlines is that they are not renegotiation-proof: players prefer to
ignore a deadline once it is reached.7
2 THE MODEL
A set of risk-neutral and time-consistent players N := {1,...,n} works on a joint task.
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1,2,...}. The team has T ≥ 2 periods of time
to solve the task. The time limit T is potentially very large, but ﬁnite.9 It can be
interpreted as the time when solving the task is no longer economically interesting;
see Section 5.4.
When the task is solved the team obtains a joint reward of Z > 0, which is
immediately paid. Initially we assume that the reward is shared equally so that each
player receives z := Z/n.10 When the task is not solved in period t, then each player
receives 0 in t.
At the beginning of period t, each player i decides how much eﬀort to invest:
et,i ∈ {0,1}, where 0 denotes no eﬀort and 1 eﬀort.11 Eﬀort costs are private and
normalized to et,i. It is useful to deﬁne et :=
 
N et,i as the team’s investment in
eﬀort in period t. The vector e = (e1,...,et,...,eT) is denoted as the eﬀort proﬁle.
The probability that the task is solved in t is p × et, where 0 < p < 1/n.12 The
idea is that when more players invest eﬀort in a period, it is more likely that the
task is solved in this period. The eﬀort decisions made by players are not veriﬁable
and therefore not contractible. Because the production technology is known and our
arguments rely on backward induction, it is not important whether eﬀort is observable
or not by other players.
When the task is solved at the end of period t or we are at the end of period
T, the game ends. Otherwise, the next period begins and players decide again how
much eﬀort they want to invest. We start with the simplest case where there is no
discounting.13
Player i’s strategy is the plan which describes how much eﬀort she invests in
9In Section 5.2, we explore the case when there is no time limit for solving the task.
10In Section 4, we investigate how the team optimally shares the reward.
11Alternatively, each player chooses eﬀort from the continuum [0,1]. When marginal eﬀort costs
are constant, this does not change our analysis.
12In Section 5.3, we examine more general success functions.
13We consider discounting in Section 3.3.8
which period, conditional that this period is reached.14 Formally, i’s strategy is
si = (e1,i,...,et,i,...,eT,i). The solution concept we use is subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
3 ANALYSIS
Denote player i’s continuation payoﬀ of reaching period t by Ct,i. The continuation
payoﬀ can also be interpreted as the expected payoﬀ of the player, from t to T. It
depends on the parameters of the game (p,z,n,T) as well as on the players’ strategies.
Because the game ends, at the latest, after period T, we have Ct,i = 0 ∀t > T,i ∈ N.
Player i’s continuation payoﬀ at period t is
Ct,i = etpz + (1 − etp)Ct+1,i − et,i. (1)
The interpretation of this Bellman equation is as follows: the player’s expected payoﬀ
equals the probability of success in t times the per-capita reward which is then paid,
plus the probability of failure in t times the continuation payoﬀ of the next period
minus the eﬀort costs which eventually accrue.
We assume as a tie-breaking rule that a player invests in case of indiﬀerence.15
Player i maximizes her expected payoﬀ over her eﬀort choice. From (1) the following
lemma is immediate.
L e m m a 1: Player i invests eﬀort in t if and only if
p(z − Ct+1,i) ≥ 1.
Intuitively, player i’s incentive constraint is satisﬁed if and only if the additional
payoﬀ from success, namely (z − Ct+1,i), times the additional probability that there
is success when she invests eﬀort, namely p, is at least as great as her private eﬀort
costs of 1.











14We can allow for mixed strategies, but this does not contribute to the point we want to make.
15This assumption is not crucial. Instead, one can also assume that a player does not invest in
case of indiﬀerence.9
Because a player cannot obtain z for sure and eﬀort costs are nonnegative, Ct,i < z
for all t ∈ {1,...,T},i ∈ N. From (1) we see that this implies that a player always
beneﬁts when another player invests eﬀort.
It is useful to denote the continuation payoﬀ of reaching period t, given that
all players always invest from t until T, as ˆ Ct,i. Throughout the paper we mean
by investing in some future period, investing conditional that this period is reached
because the task is not yet solved. From (2) we get that
ˆ Ct,i = (npz − 1)
1 − (1 − np)T−t+1
np
. (3)
Because a player can always decide not to invest, a continuation payoﬀ is never
negative. Together with Lemma 1, this implies that a necessary condition for invest-
ment is the following.
A s s u m p t i o n 1: pz ≥ 1.
Throughout the paper we maintain Assumption 1. We brieﬂy discuss it in Section
4.6.3. Assumption 1 implies that in the static game (T = 1) all players invest eﬀort.
We ﬁrst look at the benchmark case, where the social planner solves the problem.
P ro p o s i t i o n 1: For the special case where n = 1 and pZ = 1 welfare is zero
for all investment proﬁles. Otherwise, in the ﬁrst-best all players always invest eﬀort.
Moreover,
 
N Ct,i increases with a higher level of eﬀort es, where s ≥ t.
Intuitively, welfare is maximized when players use every chance to solve the task,
i.e., always invest eﬀort when the task is not solved.
3.1 SINGLE PLAYER
Suppose there is a single player. Because CT+1,1 = 0, Lemma 1 implies that the
player invests in T if and only if pz ≥ 1, which holds because of Assumption 1.
To determine the player’s decisions in the other periods we have to determine
whether or not the following inequality holds for all t ∈ {1,...,T}
p
 
z − ˆ Ct,1
  ?
≥ 1. (4)10








Note that ˆ Ct,1 is increasing in T. Therefore, for any ﬁnite T we have
p
 
z − ˆ Ct,1
 
≥ 1. (6)
From before, we already know that the player will invest in T. Given this, CT,1 = ˆ CT,1.
Therefore, Lemma 1 and (6) imply that it is optimal for the player to invest in T −1.
Then CT−1,1 = ˆ CT−1,1 and it is again optimal for the player to invest in T −2. These
arguments can be repeated and imply the following proposition.
P ro p o s i t i o n 2: A single player always invests eﬀort.
The intuition is that the player always invests, because there are no externalities
from team production and so her continuation payoﬀ is rather small in early periods
also.
3.2 SEVERAL PLAYERS
Consider now the case with n ≥ 2 players. From Lemma 1 we see that players invest
in T because CT+1,i = 0. Similar to the case with a single player, we are interested
in whether or not the following inequality holds:
p
 
z − ˆ Ct,i
  ?
≥ 1. (7)

















Therefore, when the time limit is suﬃciently long it cannot hold that players always
invest eﬀort.
We want to explore exactly when players invest eﬀort and when not. The following
lemma is useful.
L e m m a 2: (i) Players choose the same investment in period t. This holds for all
t ∈ {1,...,T}.11
(ii) When players invest no eﬀort in t then Ct,i = Ct+1,i.
(iii) When players invest eﬀort in t then Ct,i > Ct+1,i.
(iv) Ct,i = ˆ Ct,i when players always invest from t on and Ct,i < ˆ Ct,i, otherwise.
The intuition for part (i) is that players are symmetric and therefore always choose
the same investment. That is, either all players invest eﬀort or not in a speciﬁc period.
The reason why part (ii) holds is that when nothing happens in period t, then the
expected payoﬀ at the beginning of period t is the same as at the beginning of period
t + 1. Because investing eﬀort by all agents is beneﬁcial, in the sense that all are
better oﬀ, part (iii) holds. The intuition for part (iv) is that when players invest less
than in the ﬁrst-best, their expected payoﬀs suﬀer.
P ro p o s i t i o n 3: (i) When the time limit is suﬃciently short, namely T ≤
¯ x + 1, where
¯ x =
ln(n − 1) − ln(npz − 1)
ln(1 − np)
,
then players always invest eﬀort.
(ii) When the time limit is suﬃciently long, namely T > ¯ x + 1, then players do
not invest eﬀort in periods t < T − ¯ x and invest eﬀort in the periods t ≥ T − ¯ x.
So when the time limit is long, players will invest if and only if there are suﬃciently
few periods left. This is in stark contrast to the ﬁndings with a single player, who
always invests eﬀort. Intuitively, when there is team production, each player knows
that shortly before the time limit all players will invest eﬀort. Then team production
generates externalities. Therefore, not investing is very attractive in early periods,
because this allows the player to exploit the future externalities arising from team
production. Technically, due to the externalities of team production the continuation
payoﬀs are too large to always sustain investment in eﬀort.
Note that Proposition 1 implies that all players would be better oﬀ if all invest
at all times. Because players’ inactivity is collectively harmful to them, we also
call inactivity procrastination. Proposition 3 can be rephrased as follows: when the
time limit is suﬃciently long, the team procrastinates. Procrastination is socially
ineﬃcient, but individually rational because in the early periods of a game, a player
is individually better oﬀ when she does not invest.12
Note that the reason why it is optimal for a player not to invest in the early
periods is not that the player hopes that some other player will invest eﬀort and
eventually solve the task. Each player is fully aware that the other players will, like
her, not invest eﬀort in early periods.
We are interested in the comparative statics.
P ro p o s i t i o n 4: d¯ x/dz > 0. Fixing z, d¯ x/dn < 0. Fixing Z, d¯ x/dn < 0.
In words, with a higher per-capita reward z procrastination is less likely16 and
players begin to invest earlier. Intuitively, the advantage of not investing today is that
future externalities arising from team production can be exploited. The drawback is
that it is less likely that the reward is ever received. With a higher per-capita reward
the latter aspect becomes more important.
The intuition why procrastination is more likely and players begin to invest later
when the number of players increases is that then the aforementioned externalities
from team production become more important. Technically, the continuation payoﬀ
when all players invest is increasing in the size of the team. The eﬀect of a higher
success parameter p on ¯ x is ambiguous.
One can yield the following result regarding the likelihood that the task is ever
solved.
P ro p o s i t i o n 5: A single player is more likely to solve the task than n ≥ 2
players if T is suﬃciently large. It is the other way round when T is suﬃciently
small.
The intuition is simple. Because a single player always invests, the likelihood that
she solves the task sometimes approaches 1 when the time limit is very long. With
several players this is not true, because they invest only in the last few periods.
3.3 DISCOUNTING
In this section, we explore how players invest when they discount future payoﬀs. We
ﬁrst consider the case where players are exponential discounters. Then we study
16Less likely in the sense that it occurs for a smaller parameter set.13
the case where players are time inconsistent and their intertemporal preferences are
described by quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
3.3.1 EXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING
Suppose that players are time consistent and use a per-period discount factor of
δ ∈ (0,1]. As in the case without discounting a social planner directs players to
always invest eﬀort.
P ro p o s i t i o n 6: In the ﬁrst-best players always invest eﬀort.









where δ ∈ (0,1] and us,i is the instantaneous utility experienced in period s.
The Bellman equation (1) gets
Ct,i = etpz + (1 − etp)δCt+1,i − et,i. (10)













ˆ Ct,i = (npz − 1)
1 − (δ(1 − np))T−t+1
1 − δ(1 − np)
. (12)
From (10), it is optimal for player i to invest in period t if and only if
p(z − δCt+1,i) ≥ 1. (13)
The next proposition says that discounting weakly improves the players incentives to
invest.
P ro p o s i t i o n 7: With discounting players invest in all periods where they
would also invest without discounting and they may invest in more periods.14
The intuition is that discounting lowers the present value of reaching future pe-
riods. Thereby investing eﬀort in the present gets more attractive. Proposition 7
implies together with Proposition 2 that a single player always invests eﬀort also
when there is discounting.
Another result, see the next proposition, is that for low discount factors δ there
is no procrastination. The intuition is that for low discount factors players care little
about the future externalities arising from team production.
P ro p o s i t i o n 8: When δ ≤ ¯ δ :=
(pz−1)
(pz−1)+p(n−1) then players always invest ef-
fort. When δ > ¯ δ and T is suﬃciently large, players do not always invest eﬀort.
The following result says that with discount factors close to 1 nothing changes
compared to the case without discounting.
P ro p o s i t i o n 9: Generically, for every game (p,z,n,T) there exists a ` δ < 1
such that for all δ ∈ (` δ,1) the equilibrium is the same as without discounting (δ = 1).
When the periods (or even the time limit) are short it is reasonable to assume
that the discount factor is close to 1. Then discounting does, at least qualitatively,
not change much, cf. Propositions 8 and 9.
3.3.2 QUASI-HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING
We next consider the case where players are time-inconsistent and present-biased.
Formally, we assume that players have β − δ preferences, see Phelps and Pollak










where β,δ ∈ (0,1]. The Bellman equation (1) gets
Ct,i = etpz + (1 − etp)δβCt+1,i − et,i. (15)
Hence, player i invests in period t if and only if
(p(z − δβCt+1,i) ≥ 1. (16)15
We ﬁrst consider the case where players are aware of the time-inconsistency problems.
Then players’ planned investments in eﬀort and their actual investments coincide.
From (16) we see that player i is, all else equal, more eager to invest eﬀort when
β < 1 than when β = 1. The reason therefore is that, because the reward Z is payed
instantaneously to players in case of success, quasi-hyperbolic discounting (at least
weakly) improves players incentives to invest today.17
P ro p o s i t i o n 10: When β ≤ ¯ β :=
(z−1/p)(1−δ(1−np))
δ(npz−1) players always invest
eﬀort. When β > ¯ β and T is suﬃciently large, then players do not always invest
eﬀort.
The threshold is minimized—i.e., most diﬃcult to undercut—for δ = 1, in which
case ¯ β =
pz−1
pz−1/n. When for example, z = 12, n = 2, and p = 1/4, then ¯ β = 4/5, which
is above the level estimated by Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2007). Although
this is not the case for all parameter constellations, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is
clearly a factor which can mitigate or even prevent procrastination in teams.
When players are not aware of their time-inconsistency problem they believe that
their future behavior coincides with the one of players who have an exponential dis-
count function (i.e., β = 1), see Section 3.3.1. The same holds true for the believes
about the other players’ investments when a player is not aware of the other players’
time-inconsistency problems. All this provides another channel why a player invests:
she erroneously believes that she and the other players will not invest in some future
periods; this wrong belief leads to an underestimation of the continuation payoﬀ; as
we see from (16), this has the eﬀect that the player is more eager to invest eﬀort.
17When the reward is payed with delay this argument no longer holds because then also the reward
is discounted with factors δ and β.16
4 CONTRACT DESIGN
Previously, we assumed that the players’ rewards are exogenously given. We now































t,i is the wage which player i receives when there is success in period t and wF
t,i
when there is failure. For the special case of equal sharing, wS
t,i = Z/n and wF
t,i = 0.
How does the team optimally design such a contract? Are there contracts which
alleviate procrastination? We consider the case where there is no discounting, because
then procrastination is most likely and therefore most diﬃcult to mitigate.
Player i’s continuation payoﬀ at t is given by the following Bellman equation:
Ct,i = etpw
S


































which is a generalization of Lemma 1.










t,i ≤ 0. (21)
Because it is ex post not in the interest of the players to waste resources (cf. Holm-
str¨ om 1982, p. 327), any contract which does this would be renegotiated by the











t,i = 0. (22)17
From (18) we get that with a balanced budget
 
N
Ct,i = etpZ + (1 − etp)
 
N
Ct+1,i − et. (23)
Iterative use of this equation yields
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The ﬁrst part is the expected payoﬀ when one additional player invests in one period,
which consists of the additional expected payoﬀ of pZ minus the eﬀort costs of 1.
The sum is the expected number of players who invest from t until T, taking into
account that the task may be solved before some period s.





1,i is maximized. When two contracts yield diﬀerent ex-
pected payoﬀs, then the team is able to make transfers such that all players are
better oﬀ under the contract with the higher expected payoﬀ. Alternatively, the
players’ names can be drawn from an urn; then all players are in expectation better
oﬀ under the contract with the higher expected payoﬀ.










Note that because wages are just transfers between players, Proposition 1 stays
valid also when the team can design the wage contract. That is, the team’s expected
payoﬀ improves when more players invest and is maximized when all players always
invest.
4.1 THE FIRST-BEST
We now explore when the ﬁrst-best is implementable and when not.
P ro p o s i t i o n 11: When the ﬁrst-best is implementable with some contract it
is also implementable with the equal-sharing contract wS
t,i = Z/n and wF
t,i = 0. The
ﬁrst-best is implementable if and only if T ≤ ¯ x + 1, where ¯ x is given in Proposition
3.18
That is, when the ﬁrst-best is implementable the team can use the simple equal-
sharing contract. The idea of the proof is that when the equal-sharing contract does
not implement the ﬁrst-best, we cannot ﬁnd a contract that implements the ﬁrst-best
because the team’s budget has to be balanced and therefore not all players can be
incentivized to invest eﬀort in all periods.
4.2 THE SECOND-BEST
When T > ¯ x + 1, the ﬁrst-best is not implementable and we can only look for a
second-best contract. What does the second-best contract look like? We are ﬁrst
interested in whether or not the equal-sharing contract is second-best. Suppose that
initially the equal-sharing contract wS
t,i = Z/n and wF
t,i = 0 is used. Then, because
the ﬁrst-best is not implementable the team does not invest in the early periods
t < T − ¯ x, see Proposition 3. When the equal-sharing contract is modiﬁed for period
1 and players 1 and 2, so that wS
1,1 is huge and wS
1,2 = −wS
1,1 + 2Z/n, player 1 will
invest eﬀort in t = 1. Due to this modiﬁcation, the investments in all periods are the
same as with the initial equal-sharing contract, except for period 1 where player 1
invests instead of nobody. From Proposition 1 we know that this is an improvement
for the team.





t,j holds for all t ∈ {1,...,T} and for all i,j ∈ N. Otherwise, the contract
is discriminatory.
Because the only nondiscriminatory contract which fulﬁlls budget balance is the
equal-sharing contract, the aforementioned insights imply that the second-best con-
tract has to be discriminatory.18 Proposition 12 summarizes.
P ro p o s i t i o n 12: When the ﬁrst-best is not implementable, the equal-sharing
contract is not second-best. A second-best contract has to be discriminatory.
18Note that although our theory predicts that it is possibly optimal to discriminate between
players, it does not predict that discrimination has to condition on personal characteristics like
gender, age, race, religion, sexual orientation, or social group.19
An attractive contract is the following. For the periods t ≥ T − ¯ x impose the
equal-sharing contract. For early periods, set wS
t,i − wF
t,i suﬃciently large for all
players {2,...,n}, so that these players invest eﬀort, and set player 1’s wages wS
t,1 and
wF
t,1 to balance the budget. Then, in the early periods all except one player invest and
for later periods all players invest. We call the aforementioned contract handsome
contract. Can one ﬁnd another contract which is better? The answer is no.
P ro p o s i t i o n 13: The handsome contract is second-best. It implements et =
n for periods t ≥ T − ¯ x and et = n − 1 for periods t < T − ¯ x.
In a handsome contract player 1 acts, in a sense, as a principal in the early periods
t < T−¯ x, where she breaks the budget conditions for the subteam consisting of players
{2,...,n}. Thereby she can induce all players of the subteam to invest. In the late
periods t ≥ T − ¯ x, breaking the budget balance condition is no longer necessary and
player 1 invests eﬀort herself.
Consider the example from the beginning (Z = 10, n = 2, p = 1/4, T = 2). An















It is readily veriﬁed that player 1 only invests in t = 2, while player 2 always invests.
The eﬀort proﬁle is (1,2).
There are also wage contracts which induce a diﬀerent eﬀort proﬁle and which are














Then player 1 only invests in t = 1, while player 2 always invests. The eﬀort proﬁle
is then (2,1). This contract is, however, not renegotiation-proof. At the beginning
of period 2 players can improve. With contract (26) each player’s expected payoﬀ in
period 2 is 3/4. By writing a new contract wS
2,1 = wS
2,2 = 5 and wF
2,1 = wF
2,2 = 0 both
players invest eﬀort in period 2 and each player’s expected payoﬀ improves to 3/2.20
When players are able to renegotiate contracts, considering renegotiation-proof
contracts is without loss of generality. The reason is that, because the players foresee
renegotiations, one can directly set wages so that renegotiations are superﬂuous.
P ro p o s i t i o n 14: The handsome contract is renegotiation-proof. Any second-
best contract which is renegotiation-proof induces the same eﬀort proﬁle as the hand-
some contract.
Although there are usually several second-best contracts which are renegotiation-
proof, this result says that all these contracts implement the same eﬀort proﬁle.
4.3 LIMITED LIABILITY
In this section, we explore whether or not limited liability restricts the team’s opti-
mization problem. Suppose that players have no wealth, which causes their liability
to be limited, and therefore requires wages to be nonnegative: wS
t,i,wF
t,i ≥ 0 ∀t ∈
{1,..,T},i ∈ N. This implies, together with the budget balance condition (22) that
wF
t,i = 0 ∀t ∈ {1,..,T},i ∈ N.
Observe that when the ﬁrst-best is implementable without limited liability, it
is implementable with the equal-sharing contract; see Proposition 11. Because this
contract respects limited liability, it is then also implementable with limited liability.
P ro p o s i t i o n 15: When the ﬁrst-best is implementable without limited liabil-
ity, it is also implementable with limited liability.
Next, suppose that the ﬁrst-best is not implementable even without limited liabil-
ity. That is, T > ¯ x+1. Is the second-best without limited liability also implementable
when there is limited liability? We require the contract to be renegotiation-proof. By
Proposition 14, we therefore can concentrate on the second-best contract where all
players invest in the late periods t ≥ T − ¯ x and n−1 players invest eﬀort in the early
periods t < T − ¯ x. The following proposition says that when there are two players
the limited liability constraint does not matter.
P ro p o s i t i o n 16: With two players, the second-best without limited liability
is also implementable with limited liability.21
The idea is that limited liability is no problem when one designs a contract which
lets players invest alternatingly in the early periods.
For the case with three or more players we have the following result.
P ro p o s i t i o n 17: When there are n ≥ 3 players, T is suﬃciently large, and
Z < Z := n(n − 2)/p + 1/p − n(n − 1)(n − 2)/2,
then the second-best without limited liability is not implementable with limited liability.
For example, when n = 3 and p = 0.1, then Z = 37. Assumption 1 only requires
that Z ≥ 30. So when, for example, Z = 35, Proposition 17 says that the second-best
is not implementable when T is suﬃciently large.
For many parameter constellations Z ≥ Z is not only a necessary condition, but
also suﬃcient for the second-best without limited liability to be implementable with
limited liability. This is, however, not true in general. This can be seen from the
following example.
An Example.— Suppose n = 3, p = 0.3, and T = 2. Then Z = 101
3. In the second-
best without limited liability, we have e2 = 3 and e1 = 2. Suppose, without loss of
generality, that player 1 only invests in period 2, while the other players always invest.
Then the incentive constraint (20) requires that in period 2 we have wS
2,i ≥ 10/3 for
i = 1,2,3. The continuation payoﬀ is then C2,i = e2pwS
2,i−1 ≥ 2 for i = 1,2,3. Given
this, the incentive constraint of period 1 requires that wS
1,2,wS
1,3 ≥ 16/3. Because due
to limited liability wS
1,1 ≥ 0, this implies that
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Sharing information and experiences are often central elements to improve the pro-
ductivity in teams. Up to now we have assumed that these aspects do not play a role
or are not inﬂuenced by the form of the contract. We now suppose that a player can
deteriorate the productivity of the team by strategically withholding information and
experiences. We look at the extreme scenario where a single player can make success
impossible in a period. See Lazear (1989) for a static model of team production with
sabotage and Itoh (1991) for a model with helping eﬀort, which can be interpreted
as negative sabotage.22
We suppose that each player can destruct a success of the team by sabotage. This
causes private eﬀort costs for the player of κ ≥ 0.19 It is optimal for player i not to




t,i ≥ Ct+1,i + w
F
t,i − κ, (27)





t,i + κ ≥ Ct+1,i. (28)
We call this the “no sabotage constraint”.
When some player will sabotage it is no longer optimal for the other players to
invest eﬀort because eﬀort is costly. Given that no player will sabotage, it is optimal









Observe that when this inequality is satisﬁed, (28) is satisﬁed, too, and player i has
no incentive to sabotage.
When there is sabotage, then no success is possible. Therefore, we concentrate
on contracts (wS,wF) where there is no sabotage. Summing (28) and (29) over all

















Using the budget balance conditions (22) yields
et ≤





Players maximize the team’s expected payoﬀ by setting et as high as possible.











19One can easily reformulate the problem and assume that a player has to invest in sabotage
without yet knowing whether or not there would be success in this period without sabotage.
20It is not important for our results how cases of indiﬀerence are solved.23
where ⌊a⌋ is the ﬂoor function which yields the largest integer not greater than a.
The team can indeed implement this level of et because it can construct a contract
such that the incentive constraint holds for et players and the no sabotage constraint
for n − et players.
When we are close to the time limit, then
 
N Ct+1,i is relatively low and (31)
does not have much bite. For example, when t = T, then all players invest eﬀort
with an equal-sharing contract and no player has a reason to sabotage. On the other
extreme, when T is large relative to t,
 
N Ct+1,i is close to Z−1/p when from t until





The right-hand-side is in the interval [1,n). This implies that when there are two
players, the team can only implement that one player invests eﬀort. For larger teams
the same holds true when the costs of sabotage are suﬃciently low: the right-hand-
side is lower than 2 for κ < 1
p(n−2). In contrast, without sabotage (and with full
liability) at least n − 1 players can be induced to invest eﬀort in every period. To
sum up, the possibility that players can sabotage the team’s success has the eﬀect of
seriously restricting the team’s desire to implement high levels of eﬀort et, especially
when there are more than two players.
An Example.— Suppose that Z = 24, n = 3, p = 1/4, and κ = 0. We solve the
problem by backward induction, which ensures renegotiation-proofness. Throughout
we set wF
t,i = 0 and show that this is optimal.
Period t = T: Set wS
T,i = Z/3 = 8 for all players. Then the incentive constraint
(29) is satisﬁed for all players. Hence, eT = 3, CT,i = 5, and
 
N CT,i = 15.
Period t = T − 1: From (31) we see that eT−1 ≤ 9/4. Hence, we can at most
implement eT−1 = 2. We set wS
T−1,1 = 6 and wS
T−1,2 = wS
T−1,3 = 9. For player
1 the no sabotage constraint (28) is satisﬁed. For players 2 and 3 the incentive
21To see this, observe that with et = 1 for all t we get with (3) that
 





p . For limT→∞ Cn=1
t,1 = Z − 1/p. Moreover, from Proposition 1 we know
that higher investments increase welfare which implies that when et ≥ 1 for all t and sometimes
et > 1,
 




p . Finally, Proposition 1 and (3) imply that
 
N Ct,i
cannot exceed Z − 1/p.24
constraint (29) is satisﬁed. Hence, eT−1 = 2, CT−1,1 = 5.5, CT−1,2 = CT−1,3 = 6, and
 
N CT−1,i = 17.5.
Periods t = T − 2: From (31) eT−2 ≤ 13/8. Therefore, we can at most get
eT−2 = 1. We set wS
T−2,1 = 5.5, wS
T−2,2 = 6, and wS
T−2,3 = 12.5. For players 1 and
2 the no sabotage constraint (28) is satisﬁed. For player 3 the incentive constraint
(29) is satisﬁed. Hence, eT−2 = 1, CT−2,1 = 5.5, CT−2,2 = 6, CT−2,3 = 53/8, and
 
N CT−2,1 = 145/8.
Periods t < T − 2: Because
 
N Ct,i is nonincreasing in t, we cannot get et ≥ 2,
see (31). Using the wage contracts from period T − 2 we get that players 1 and 2
do not sabotage. Player 3 always invests eﬀort because one can show that Ct,3 ≤
wS
T−2,3 − 1/p = 8.5 even when T is large and so the incentive constraint (29) is
satisﬁed. Hence, et = 1 for all t < T − 2.
Finally, when we set wF
t,i  = 0 in some periods for some players (31) stays unaﬀected
for a balanced budget. Hence, we cannot yield a better contract.
4.5 THE MODEL WITH A PRINCIPAL
Suppose the team hires a principal.22 This allows the team to get rid of the bud-
get balance constraints. That is, it is possible to have a contract (wS,wF) with
 
N wS
t,i T Z and
 
N wF
t,i T 0. We assume that the team has all the bargaining
power and that the contract (wS,wF) is conducted when the team hires the prin-
cipal. Furthermore, the principal is not wealth-constraint, risk-neutral, and has an
outside option of zero. We suppose that the principal receives the reward Z when the
task is solved. This is without loss of generality, because the wage contract can be
speciﬁed in a way that the principal pays some or all of the reward back to the team.
We consider two cases. First the case with full liability of the team members, then
the case with limited liability. We explore whether or not it is possible to implement
the ﬁrst-best.
22When the principal hires a team this does not change our results when team members are fully
liable. When their liability is limited, it is easier to obtain the result that the ﬁrst-best is not
implemented, because the principal is not willing to pay wage bills exceeding the reward.25
4.5.1 FULL LIABILITY
It is straightforward that, because of the players’ risk neutrality and there is no
limited liability constraint, the team can hire a principal to induce the ﬁrst-best.
P ro p o s i t i o n 18: When team members are fully liable the team can hire a
principal to implement the ﬁrst-best.
The idea of the proof is that the team can set {wS
t,i − wF
t,i} suﬃciently high to
incentivize all team members to invest eﬀort. The principal receives zero expected
proﬁts when the levels of {wS
t,i} and {wF
t,i} are appropriately chosen. Because the
ﬁrst-best is implemented and the principal receives zero expected proﬁts the team’s
expected payoﬀ is maximized.
4.5.2 LIMITED LIABILITY
We next consider the case where the team members are protected by limited lia-
bility. We suppose that the reason for limited liability is that they have initially
no wealth. Then they are unable to pay the principal a transfer before the reward
is eventually realized. A necessary condition that the team can hire a principal is
that the principal’s expected proﬁt is nonnegative; otherwise the principal would not
participate.
In the ﬁrst-best we have et = n for all t ∈ {1,...,T}. Because we seek to show that
there is eventually no wage contract (wS,wF) for which the ﬁrst-best is implemented
and the principal’s expected proﬁt is nonnegative we set wages as low as possible,
given the incentive and the limited liability constraints: wF
t,i = 0 and wS
t,i = Ct+1,i +
1/p.
By backward induction we yield that23
CT−x,i = (x + 1)(n − 1), w
S
T−x,i = x(n − 1) + 1/p. (34)


















23Also in Mason and V¨ alim¨ aki’s (2008) model of dynamic moral hazard with a single agent the
wage is decreasing over time.26
For the case where the ﬁrst-best is implemented and wS




np[Z − n((T − s)(n − 1) + 1/p)](1 − np)
s−1 
. (36)
Hence, when T is suﬃciently large the principal’s expected proﬁt is negative.
P ro p o s i t i o n 19: With limited liability, the ﬁrst-best cannot be implemented
with a principal when T is suﬃciently large.
Intuitively, when T is large the early wages wS
t,i have to be huge to convince players
to invest eﬀort. Then, in case of success, the principal has to pay wages which exceed
the reward Z by a large extent. Because it is quite likely that the principal has to
pay these huge wages, her expected proﬁt is negative.
4.6 FURTHER RESULTS
In this section, we use our previous insights to obtain further results concerning (i)
deadlines, (ii) discrimination and players’ payoﬀs, and (iii) team size and the relevance
of Assumption 1.
4.6.1 DEADLINES
We ﬁrst consider the case where the team’s reward is shared equally. Then with
discounting, procrastination in teams has two negative eﬀects on welfare. First, as
without discounting, the total eﬀort is too low because the team does not always
invest, which is suboptimal. Second, the team invests too late. Holding the number
of periods in which players invest eﬀort constant, the team would be better oﬀ when
players invest earlier. This can be achieved by a deadline, i.e., an artiﬁcially short time
limit of T deadline < T. Speciﬁcally, when δ is suﬃciently close to one and T > ¯ x + 1,
then we know from Propositions 3 and 9 that players do not invest eﬀort in the early
periods t < T − ¯ x. Then setting a deadline T deadline = ¯ x + 1 has the eﬀect that
players no longer procrastinate and invest for the same number of periods as without
the deadline. Hence, the present value of the team’s expected payoﬀ increases. One
may therefore conclude that deadlines are beneﬁcial for a team. There are, however,
two problems with this argument.27
First, deadlines are not renegotiation-proof. When the team arrives at period
T deadline and has no success, the expected payoﬀ from obeying the deadline is zero,
while ignoring the deadline and continuing yields a positive expected payoﬀ.
Second, designing an appropriate contract is a better measure to alleviate procras-
tination than a deadline, at least when δ is suﬃciently close to one. We next prove
this claim. Denote the present value of the team’s expected payoﬀ, measured at the
beginning of the game with the deadline, by
 
N CTdeadline
1,i . A necessary condition for
T deadline to be optimal is that the team cannot improve by setting the deadline one










2,i − e1. (37)
Note that the team can at least implement e1 = n − 1; this is implemented by
setting wS
1,i suﬃciently large for players i ∈ {2,...,n} and wS
1,1 such that the budget is
balanced. Moreover, the team can use the same contract as when the deadline would










1,i − (n − 1). (38)
Therefore, when











then the deadline T deadline cannot be optimal. Rewriting (39) yields















1,i is maximal when the team is able to implement the ﬁrst-best. Hence,










1,i = (npZ − n)
1 − (δ(1 − np))Tdeadline





1,i << Z − 1/p. This implies that (40) is satisﬁed, at least for
δ suﬃciently close to 1. We conclude that a suﬃcient condition that players do not
want to use a deadline—even if they could commit to it—is that δ is suﬃciently close
to 1.28
4.6.2 DISCRIMINATION AND PLAYERS’ PAYOFFS
One may presume that when a player i receives wages (wS
t,i,wF
t,i) which are higher
than the ones of a player j, player i is in equilibrium better oﬀ than player j. To show
that this is not true consider the following example. When Z = 10, n = 2, p = 1/4,














where ε is positive and small. The players’ expected per-period payoﬀs are the same in
period 2, while in period 1, player 1 yields (3+ε)/4 and player 2 yields (7−ε)/4−1 =
(3 − ε)/4. Hence, although player 2 receives a higher wage than player 1, player 2 is
worse oﬀ than player 1.
The intuition is that player 2 receives a higher wage which motivates her to invest
eﬀort, while the wage for player 1 is too low to motivate her to invest. Player 2’s eﬀort
is also beneﬁcial for player 1, due to the externalities of team production. Because
only player 2 has to bear eﬀort costs, she is worse oﬀ than player 1. This ﬁnding has
the interesting implication that an outside party (e.g., a judge) is in general not able
to infer that player 1 is disadvantaged compared to 2 when 1 receives lower wages
than 2, unless the outside party knows both players’ eﬀort costs.
This result crucially depends on our assumption that there is team production.
When there is no team production, so that each player works on her own, then a
player who possess a higher remunerated contract than another player is necessarily
better oﬀ, because she can mimic the latter’s eﬀort choice.
4.6.3 TEAM SIZE AND ASSUMPTION 1
One may be tempted to conclude that when one cannot design a wage contract where
all players always invest eﬀort, decreasing the size of the team need not reduce the
team’s expected payoﬀ. This thought is wrong.
P ro p o s i t i o n 20: For all n′ < n′′ and for all Z′ ≤ Z′′ the team’s expected
payoﬀ is lower with n′ players than with n′′.29
The idea is that when the team optimally designs the wage contract, then the
implemented team eﬀort et is weakly lower for all periods, and strictly lower for some
periods with a small team than with a large team. This deteriorates the team’s
expected payoﬀ. These arguments also imply that when the team designs the wage
contract optimally, larger teams more likely solve the task. This result is in contrast
to the one with an equal-sharing contract, see Proposition 5.
What happens when Assumption 1 is violated because pz < 1? Then with the
equal-sharing contract no player ever invests. A team can implement that n − 1
players invest eﬀort in all periods by designing a discriminatory contract, where—
just like in the early periods with a handsome contract—one player acts as a quasi-
principal. This contract is beneﬁcial for the team if Zp > 1. By arguments similar
to the ones where Assumption 1 holds, this contract can be shown to be second-best
and renegotiation-proof. Although a larger team never yields a lower expected team
payoﬀ than a smaller team (because it can mimic the eﬀort proﬁle of a smaller team),
there are constellations where a larger team may yield the same expected payoﬀ as a
smaller team. A simple example is when T = 1, n′/p ≤ Z′ = Z′′ < (n′ + 1)/p. Then
with n′ players e1 = n′ is implementable, while with n′′ = n′ + 1 players one can at
most implement e1 = n′′ − 1 = n′, too.
5 EXTENSIONS
In this section, we oﬀer several extensions. Throughout we assume that the reward
is shared equally. In Section 5.1, we suppose that players have social preferences. We
explore how teams are optimally designed when players are heterogenous with respect
to their social preferences and show that it is better to have teams with heterogenous
players than to have homogenous teams. In Section 5.2, we explore the case when
there is no time limit for solving the task. We characterize the symmetric Markov
perfect equilibrium. In Section 5.3, we allow for very general success functions and
consider the cases where the success function is superadditive or subadditive. In
Section 5.4, we suppose that the reward which the team obtains for solving the task
declines over time. We then show that there might be an artiﬁcial time limit and
that players might not invest eﬀort when the reward is high, but invest eﬀort when it30
is rather low. In Section 5.5, we assume that there are several tasks which the team
can solve. We show that when there are less tasks than periods in which the team
can work on the tasks, the team might procrastinate.
5.1 SOCIAL PREFERENCES AND TEAM DESIGN
Numerous experiments show that many people are not purely self-interested. Moti-
vated by these ﬁndings we assume in this section that players have social preferences.24
Suppose that each player puts a weight of φ ∈ [0,1] on the other players’ material
payoﬀs.25 The parameter φ captures how much a player cares about the other players’
well-being, compared to her own well-being. A purely selﬁsh player is characterized
by φ = 0, whereas for an altruistic player φ = 1.
Simple calculations show that, taking the other players’ well-being into account
with weight φ, player i invests eﬀort in period t if and only if
p






 ≥ 1. (43)
Because φ(n−1)z−φ
 
N\i Ct+1,j > 0, player i is, all else equal, more eager to invest
eﬀort the larger is φ.
We ﬁrst explore how players, which have homogenous social preferences, invest
eﬀort. Then we allow the players to have heterogenous social preferences and study
how teams are optimally designed. Throughout we assume that there are n ≥ 2
players.
5.1.1 HOMOGENOUS PLAYERS
When players have homogenous social preferences we get the following result.
P ro p o s i t i o n 21: For φ = 1 players always invest eﬀort. For φ < 1 and
when T is suﬃciently large, players do not always invest eﬀort. Compared to the
24Kandel and Lazear (1992) consider a team model with moral hazard, where players are selﬁsh,
but care about peer pressure.
25See, for example, Charness and Rabin (2002) for a more general framework and an experimental
investigation.31
case where players are purely selﬁsh (φ = 0), social players (φ > 0) begin to invest
eﬀort weakly earlier.
For φ = 1 players are altruistic and always invest, because this maximizes welfare.
For φ < 1 and when the time limit T is suﬃciently long we get again the result that the
team procrastinates. But as the last part of Proposition 21 clariﬁes, procrastination
is alleviated by social preferences.
5.1.2 HETEROGENOUS PLAYERS
We now suppose that players have heterogeneous social preferences. A classical issue
of economics (e.g., Lazear 1989 and Jeon 1996) is how players should be grouped
together, i.e., how teams should be designed. Suppose there are two players who are
purely selﬁsh (φ = 0) and two social players with φ = ¯ φ ∈ (0,1). How should one
form two teams, each consisting of two players?
When a player decides to invest in period t, then the expected payoﬀ must be
at least as great as the one from not doing so. Moreover, we know from before that
it is beneﬁcial for a player’s material well-being when another one invests. Both
arguments imply that Ct,i + φiCt,−i ≥ Ct+1,i + φiCt+1,−i when some player invests
in t. When no player invests then Ct,i + φiCt,−i = Ct+1,i + φiCt+1,−i. Together with
(43) these ﬁndings imply that all players’ strategies are simple threshold rules which
specify when a player starts to invest. Denote the period in which player i starts to
invest by t(φi,φ−i), where φ−i is the social preference parameter of the teammate.
From before we know that a social player is more eager to invest eﬀort than a selﬁsh
player. Hence, t(0,φ−i) ≥ t(¯ φ,φ−i). We get two further results.
L e m m a 3: t(0,0) = t(0, ¯ φ) and t(¯ φ,0) ≤ t(¯ φ, ¯ φ).
That is, a selﬁsh player invests rather late—due to t(0,φ−i) ≥ t(¯ φ,φ−i)—and her
behavior is not inﬂuenced whether she is matched with another selﬁsh player or a
social player. A social player i begins to invest earlier. When matched with a selﬁsh
player the term Ct+1,i+φiCt+1,−i is rather low because the selﬁsh player invests rather
late. That is why a social player begins to invest earlier when matched with a selﬁsh
player than when matched with another social player.32
We next explore whether it is better to have two homogenous teams (one with
social and one with selﬁsh players) or two heterogenous teams (each consisting of a
social and a selﬁsh player).
P ro p o s i t i o n 22: The aggregated expected payoﬀ is at least as high with het-
erogenous teams than with homogenous teams.
From Lemma 3 we know that a social player begins to invest rather late when
matched with another social player, compared to the case when matched with a selﬁsh
player. This eﬀect can be exploited by having heterogenous teams. Then we have—on
average—more investments than when teams are homogenous.
An Example.— Suppose that z = 5, p = 1/4, T = 3, and ¯ φ = 1/4. Consider ﬁrst
the case with a team consisting of two selﬁsh players. They invest in t = 3 because
p(z − 0) ≥ 1. Hence, C3,i = 2pz − 1 = 3/2. Given this, players do not invest in t = 2
because p(z − C3,i) = 7/8 < 1 and for the same reason not in t = 1. Hence, the
expected payoﬀ of the team, measured at the beginning of the game, is 2C3,i = 3.
Next consider a team with two social players. Obviously, players invest in t = 3
and C3,i = 3/2. In t = 2, players also invest because p(z + ¯ φz − C3,i − ¯ φC3,i) =
35/32 ≥ 1. Hence, C2,i = 2pz − 1 + (1 − 2p)C3,i = 9/4. In t = 1, the players do not
invest because p(z + ¯ φz − C2,i − ¯ φC2,i) = 55/64 < 1. Hence, the expected payoﬀ of
the team, measured at the beginning of the game, is 2C2,i = 9/2.
Finally, in a heterogenous team players obviously invest in t = 3 and hence C3,i =
3/2. Denote the social player as 1 and the selﬁsh player as 2. Player 2 does not
invest in t = 2 because p(z − C3,2) = 7/8 < 1. Player 1 invests in t = 2 because
p
 
z + ¯ φz − C3,1 − ¯ φC3,2
 
= 35/32 ≥ 1. Hence, C2,1 = pz−1+(1−p)C3,1 = 11/8 and
C2,2 = pz+(1−p)C3,2 = 19/8. In t = 1, player 2 does not invest because p(z−C2,2) =
21/32 < 1. But player 1 invests because p
 
z + ¯ φz − C2,1 − ¯ φC2,2
 
= 137/128 ≥ 1.
Hence, C1,1 = pz − 1 + (1 − p)C2,1 = 41/32 and C1,2 = pz + (1 − p)C2,2 = 97/32.
Therefore, having two heterogenous teams leads to an aggregated expected payoﬀ,
measured at the beginning of the game, of 2(41/32+97/32) = 69/8, whereas for two
homogenous teams we only have 3 + 9/2 = 60/8.33
5.2 INFINITE HORIZON
Previously, we assumed that there is a ﬁnite time limit. We next suppose that there
is no time limit. While in the model with a time limit the case with continuous eﬀort
is generally intractable (except when eﬀort costs are linear, only numerical results
can be obtained), this is not true when there is no time limit.
We measure eﬀort in “probability units” of success: there is success in period t
with probability
 
N et,i and failure otherwise, where et,i ∈ R+. Eﬀort causes private
costs of k(et,i), with k(0) = 0, k′ > 0, and k′′ > 0.26 To guarantee inner solutions we
assume that limet,i→0 k′(et,i) = 0 and limet,i→1/n k(et,i) = ∞.











δCt+1,i − k(et,i). (BELLMAN)
Player i chooses eﬀort et,i to maximize Ct,i. The resulting ﬁrst-order condition or
incentive constraint is
z − δCt+1,i = k
′(et,i). (IC)
We concentrate on symmetric Markov perfect equilibria (SMPE). We say that
an equilibrium is symmetric if all players choose the same investment in each period
(but the investment may depend on the period). A strategy is Markov if it does
not depend on state variables that are functions of the history of the game, except
the ones which aﬀect payoﬀs. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is then a proﬁle
of Markov strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame (cf.
Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
When the game has not ended in period t, then the team had no success until t.
The history of the team is hence the series of failures it has experienced. Because
prior failures do not aﬀect current or future payoﬀs, a MPE speciﬁes the same eﬀort
choice for a player in every period, given that the game has not yet ended.
In a SMPE a player chooses not only the same eﬀort in every period, but all
players choose the same eﬀort. Formally, et,i = eSMPE for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N.
26Having convex eﬀort costs is highly plausible and standard in agency theory. In most of our
analysis nothing changes when eﬀort costs are linear.34
Because eﬀort is constant in all periods and the same for all players we get from
(BELLMAN) that Ct,i = CSMPE for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N. Hence, (BELLMAN)










It is useful to determine the ﬁrst-best benchmark.










1 − δ + δneFB . (45)
P ro p o s i t i o n 23: There always exists a SMPE. The SMPE is unique. eSMPE
and CSMPE solve (B SMPE) and (IC SMPE).
The next result shows that only when there is a single player the investments
in eﬀort are ﬁrst-best. Otherwise, the players underinvest. See Figure 1 for an
illustration.
P ro p o s i t i o n 24: Keep z ﬁxed. eSMPE is decreasing in n, while eFB is
increasing in n. For n = 1, eSMPE = eFB and CSMPE = CFB. Otherwise,
eSMPE < eFB and CSMPE < CFB. CSMPE is increasing in n.
The intuition why eﬀort eSMPE is decreasing in the number of players n is that
the future externalities arising from team production are greater the larger the team
is. In a larger team a player has therefore less incentives to invest eﬀort. This holds
despite that the per-capita reward z is kept ﬁxed. The reason why the ﬁrst-best eﬀort
eFB is increasing in n is that in a larger team the team’s total reward nz is increasing
in n, keeping z ﬁxed. Therefore, higher investments in eﬀort are eﬃcient.
We next explore the comparative statics with respect to the per-capita reward z.









































Figure 1: Only for n = 1 is the SMPE ﬁrst-best.
Hence, lowering z, holding all else equal, decreases eﬀort eSMPE and expected payoﬀ
CSMPE, which is intuitive; see Figure 2 for the case n > 1.
The comparative statics with respect to the discount factor δ are interesting.
Because dC
dδ
   
(IC SMPE) < 0 and dC
dδ
   
(B SMPE) > 0 we get that deSMPE/dδ < 0. A
single player always chooses ﬁrst-best eﬀort; dC
dδ
   
(B SMPE) > 0 then implies that
dCSMPE
n=1 /dδ > 0. Put diﬀerently, a single player beneﬁts from a higher δ. With
several players this is not necessarily true. To see this, consider the case of quadratic
eﬀort costs k(e) = e2/2. Using (B SMPE) and (IC SMPE) we get
e
SMPE =
−(1 − δ) +
 
(1 − δ)2 + 2δ(1 − δ)z(2n − 1)
δ(2n − 1)
. (47)
Table 1 shows an example with n = 2 and z = 0.5, where players may beneﬁt from a
lower δ: they are better oﬀ when δ = 0 than with δ ∈ {0.05,...,0.8}. The intuition
is that although players are, all else equal, better oﬀ with a higher δ, see (B SMPE),36
0
(IC SMPE) z low
(IC SMPE) z high
(B SMPE) z low





Figure 2: Point A is the initial SMPE, point B the SMPE for a lower z.
they may reduce eﬀort eSMPE so much that their expected payoﬀ CSMPE is impaired.
δ 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
eSMPE 0.500 0.482 0.464 0.431 0.398 0.366 0.333
CSMPE 0.375 0.366 0.359 0.347 0.340 0.335 0.333
δ 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99 →1
eSMPE 0.299 0.261 0.217 0.159 0.116 0.055 0.000
CSMPE 0.335 0.341 0.354 0.379 0.404 0.450 0.500
Table 1: Example with n = 2, z = 0.5, and k(e) = e2/2.
Interestingly, when there are several players, n > 1, making each player a residual
claimant (each receives Z in case of success and 0 in case of failure) is not enough
to motivate the players to invest ﬁrst-best eﬀort. To see this, adjust and combine
(IC SMPE) and (B SMPE) to get
Z − δ
neZ − k(e)
1 − δ + δne
= k
′(e), (48)37
which is solved by ¨ e. In the ﬁrst-best we maxe CB(e,n) =
nez−k(e)
1−δ+δne. Hence, eFB solves
Z − δ
neZ − nk(e)
1 − δ + δne
= k
′(e). (49)
Because k′′ > 0, players underinvests when they are residual claimants: ¨ e < eFB.
The reason for this result is that a player does not take into account that solving the
task now saves n − 1 other players the future eﬀort costs from investing.
Although the SMPE is appealing, there may also exists other equilibria. In Ap-
pendix B, we show, by means of two examples, that there can be symmetric non-
Markov perfect equilibria as well as asymmetric Markov perfect equilibria. Interest-
ingly, see Appendix B, players may be better oﬀ by playing a non-Markov perfect
equilibrium than by playing a SMPE.
5.3 MORE GENERAL SUCCESS FUNCTIONS
Suppose that the task is solved in period t with probability P(et). We assume that
when no player invests eﬀort, then there is success with probability zero, that success
is more likely when more players invest eﬀort, that success is also possible when all
but one player of the team invest eﬀort, and that success is not guaranteed even when
all players invest.
A s s u m p t i o n 2: Given n ≥ 2. P(0) = 0, P ′(et) > 0, P(n − 1) > 0, and
P(n) < 1.
The continuation payoﬀ, given that all players invest eﬀort from t until T, is
ˆ Ct,i = (P(n)z − 1)
1 − (1 − P(n))T−t+1
P(n)
, (50)
which is just a slightly adapted version of (3). For the limit case
lim
T→∞




It is easy to show that, given that all other players invest in period t, it is optimal
for a player i to invest eﬀort as well if and only if
(P(n) − P(n − 1))(z − Ct+1,i) ≥ 1. (52)38





Because ˆ Ct,i is continuous in T, we get the result that the team procrastinates when
the time limit is suﬃciently long.
P ro p o s i t i o n 25: Given Assumption 2 and that n ≥ 2. When the time limit
T is suﬃciently long, not all players always invest eﬀort.
Observe that when Assumption 2 is violated because P(n − 1) = 0, the team’s
problem collapses to a coordination problem. Regardless of T, it is an equilibrium
that all players always invest when P(n)z ≥ 1; i.e., there is no procrastination. It is,
however, also an equilibrium that nobody ever invests.
We next assume that the success function P is either super- or subadditive.
D e f i n i t i o n 3: The function P is superadditive (subadditive) if P(e′ + e′′) ≥
(≤) P(e′) + P(e′′) for all e′,e′′ ≥ 0.
Superadditivity captures the idea that success is more likely when two groups of
players invest eﬀort at the same time than when the groups invest at diﬀerent times.
Then it is optimal to pool forces. Note that one reason a team may form in the ﬁrst
place may be superadditivity.
From (52) we see that, given some P(n), procrastination is more likely, in the sense
that it occurs for a larger parameter set, the smaller is (P(n)−P(n−1)). Therefore,
with subadditivity procrastination is more likely than with superadditivity. The
intuition is that with subadditivity the player is inclined to invest no eﬀort, given
that all other players invest, because the probability of success is not much higher
when she invests, namely P(n), compared to the case when she does not invest,
namely P(n − 1).
With subadditivity one may get asymmetric equilibria, where some players invest





et˜ p , for et < n,
(n − 1)˜ p + ε, for et = n,39
where ˜ p ∈ (0,1/(n−1)) and ε is positive and small. Then it cannot be an equilibrium
that all players invest for sure in some period. Additionally, there may also be
equilibria in mixed strategies.
5.4 DECREASING REWARDS
We now suppose that the reward, which the team receives for solving the task, de-
creases with time. Formally, we assume that for all t ∈ {1,...,T}, Zt > Zt+1. An
example where a decreasing reward is highly plausible is when the team’s task is to
obtain an innovation; it is usually at least weakly better to have an innovation earlier.
Recognize that once pzt < 1, where zt := Zt/n is the per-capita reward, nobody
will invest. Hence, when pzt < 1 holds for a t ≤ T, there is an artiﬁcial time limit
T art = max{t ∈ N|pzt ≥ 1}. Denote the minimum of the real and the artiﬁcial time
limit (if there is one) by T min := min{T,T art}.
We are interested whether the players always invest eﬀort until T min. This holds
if and only if
p(zt − ˇ Ct+1,i) ≥ 1 (54)
for all t ≤ T min, where ˇ Ct+1,i is the continuation payoﬀ when all players invest from
t + 1 until T min and not afterwards. This continuation payoﬀ evolves according to
ˇ Ct,i = npzt + (1 − np) ˇ Ct+1,i. (55)
Because CTmin+1 = 0 we know that all players invest in period T min. When (54) fails
for a single t ≤ T min we know that players do not always invest until T min. Then,
because the reward is decreasing in time, we get the result that players do not only
invest too seldom, but also at the wrong time. For example, when they do not invest
in period t′ < T min it would collectively be better for the players to invest in t′ instead
of T min, because zt′ > zTmin.
An Example.— Suppose that n = 2, p = 1/4, T = 5, z1 = 6.5, z2 = 6, z3 = 5,
z4 = 3.5, and z5 = 3. Because pz4 < 1 and pz5 < 1 we have an artiﬁcial time
limit T art = 3. In t = 3, both players invest because 1/4 × (5 − 0) ≥ 1. This gives
a continuation payoﬀ C3,i = 1/2 × 5 − 1 = 1.5. In t = 2, players invest because
1/4 × (6 − 1.5) ≥ 1, resulting in C2,i = 1/2 × 6 + 1/2 × 1.5 − 1 = 2.75. In t = 1,
players do not invest because 1/4 × (6.5 − 2.75) < 1.40
5.5 MULTIPLE TASKS
We have assumed that the team has to perform one task. What happens when
there are several tasks? Suppose that tasks are homogenous. When there are at
least as many task as periods, then it is without loss of generality to assume that
the players work on a diﬀerent task in every period. Then there is no scope for
procrastination, since current success or failure does not inﬂuence future investments
and payoﬀs. Otherwise, the team might procrastinate because future externalities
arising from team production make investing eﬀort in the present unattractive. To
see this, consider the following example.
An Example.— There are two tasks, z ∈ [4,6), n = 2, p = 1/4, and T = 3.
Denote the number of tasks which are not solved at the beginning of period t by
Ot. When O3 > 0, then the players invest eﬀort in t = 3, because this yields an
additional expected payoﬀ for a player of 1/4×z −1 ≥ 0. In period 2, players invest
eﬀort if O2 = 2: the game continues for sure until period 3 and the expected payoﬀ
of period 3 stays unaﬀected of what happens in period 2; therefore investing eﬀort
yields an additional expected payoﬀ for a player of 1/4 × z − 1 ≥ 0. For O2 = 1
the continuation payoﬀ of reaching period 3 with O3 = 1 is too large to motivate
players to invest eﬀort in period 2; cf. Proposition 3. Given this, the continuation











additional expected payoﬀ from investing eﬀort in period 1 is
1/4 × (z + C2,O2=1 − C2,O2=2) − 1 = z/8 − 3/4, (56)
which is negative because z < 6. To sum up, players only invest eﬀort in periods 2
and 3. So we have again the result that the team procrastinates.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we show that when players are remunerated equally and face a suﬃ-
ciently long time limit, they begin to invest eﬀort rather late. Players procrastinate
to beneﬁt from future externalities arising from team production. This is socially
ineﬃcient, but individually rational. When players can design wage contracts they
can mitigate procrastination. By remunerating players diﬀerently, one can motivate41
some players, though regularly not all of them, to invest eﬀort also in early periods.
Limited liability or the threat of sabotage can severely restrict the team’s possibilities
to motivate many players. Further results are that players who earn higher wages can
be worse oﬀ than teammates with lower wages, that with social preferences teams
are optimally designed heterogeneously, and that present-biased preferences mitigate
procrastination.
We allowed players to have heterogenous social preferences. Players may also diﬀer
with respect to other characteristics, like eﬀort costs or the eﬀectiveness of their eﬀort.
Investigating these issues is an interesting topic for future research. When players
are little heterogenous, we suspect that, generically, all of our results stay valid. The
idea is that players are generically never indiﬀerent, and therefore their decisions do
not change when there is little heterogeneity instead of homogeneity.42
APPENDIX A: PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From (57), see below, we see that
 
N C1,i is maximized when e1 is chosen optimally
and when
 
N C2,i is maximized.
 
N C2,i is in turn maximized when e2 is chosen
optimally and when
 
N C3,i is maximized. These arguments can be repeated and
imply that we can solve the social planner’s problem by backward induction.
For the special case where n = 1 and pZ = 1 we see from (2) that welfare
 
N C1,i is zero for all investment proﬁles. We now consider the case where this is




Ct,i = etpZ + (1 − etp)
 
N






= pZ − p
 
N
Ct+1,i − 1. (58)




Ct+1,i < Z − 1/p. (59)
We start with period T. Because CT+1,i = 0 and Z − 1/p > 0 holds, inequality
(59) is satisﬁed and hence eT = n.
From (57) we get
 
N




Next, consider period t = T − 1. From (60) we see that
 
N CT,i is equal to the




N CT+1,i = 0,
 
N CT,i is
lower than Z − 1/p. This implies that (59) is satisﬁed and the social planner sets
eT−1 = n.
Next, consider period t = T −2. From (60) we see that
 
N CT−1,i is equal to the




N CT,i is lower than Z − 1/p,43
 
N CT−1,i is lower than Z − 1/p, too. This implies that (59) is satisﬁed and the
social planner sets eT−2 = n.
These arguments can be repeated to show that the social planner always sets
et = n.
To prove the last part of the proposition note that because in the ﬁrst-best all




N ˆ Ct+1,i < Z − 1/p, where the last
inequality follows from the arguments before. Hence, (58) is positive and implies
that
 
N Ct,i is increasing in et. From (57),
 
N Ct,i is increasing in
 
N Ct+1,i, which
is in turn increasing in
 
N Ct+2,i, and so on. Hence,
 
N Ct,i increases with a higher
level of eﬀort es, where s ≥ t. ￿
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Part (i). In period T, all players face the same tradeoﬀ: from Lemma 1 a player
invest in T if and only if p(z − CT+1,i) ≥ 1. Therefore, in T all players choose the
same investment. Because of this, CT,i is the same for all players. Hence, in period
T − 1 they again face the same tradeoﬀ and therefore choose the same investment.
These arguments can be repeated, which establishes that all players choose the same
investment in every period.
Part (ii). When et = 0 it holds that Ct,i = Ct+1,i, see (1).
Part (iii). From Proposition 1 we know that
 
N Ct,i increases with et. Parts (i)
and (ii) imply that when players invest, Ct,i > Ct+1,i must hold.
Part (iv). When players always invest from t on then, by deﬁnition, Ct,i = ˆ Ct,i.




N ˆ Ct,i. Part (i) then yields Ct,i <
ˆ Ct,i. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
From Lemma 1 it follows that players invest eﬀort in period t if and only if the
continuation payoﬀ of t + 1 is suﬃciently low. From Lemma 2 we know that the
continuation payoﬀ is nonincreasing in t. Therefore, one of the following patterns has
to hold: the players always invest eﬀort or they do not invest eﬀort until some period,
and always invest eﬀort from this period on.44
Due to p
 
z − ˆ CT+1,i
 
≥ 1 and p
 
z − limT→∞ ˆ Ct,i
 
< 1 we know that there must
exist a ` x such that
p
 
z − ˆ CT−` x,i
 
! = 1, (61)
where t = T − ` x is now treated as a continuous variable which is possibly below 1.
With help of (3) we can solve (61) for
` x =
ln(n − 1) − ln(npz − 1)
ln(1 − np)
− 1, (62)
where ln is the natural logarithm.
It is useful to deﬁne
¯ x := ` x + 1. (63)
When T ≤ ¯ x+1, we claim that then p(z − Ct+1,i) ≥ 1 for all t ≥ 1. From Lemma
2 we know that Ct,i ≤ ˆ Ct,i and that ˆ Ct,i is decreasing in t. So when we can show that
p
 
z − ˆ C2,i
 
≥ 1, (64)
then the claim is true. Inequality (64) indeed holds because ˆ C2,i ≤ ˆ CT−` x,i due to
2 ≥ T − ` x ⇐⇒ T ≤ ¯ x + 1 and the ﬁnding that ˆ Ct,i is decreasing in t.
We ﬁnally prove part (ii), where T > ¯ x + 1. We ﬁrst show that players invest
eﬀort in the periods t ≥ T − ¯ x. This requires that p(z − Ct+1,i) ≥ 1 for all t ≥ T − ¯ x.
This is indeed true because
Ct+1,i ≤ ˆ Ct+1,i ≤ ˆ CT−` x,i, (65)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 2 and the second from the ﬁnding that
ˆ Ct,i is decreasing in t and the fact that t + 1 ≥ T − ` x ⇐⇒ t ≥ T − ¯ x.
We claimed that players do not invest eﬀort in periods t < T − ¯ x. Denote t′ =
min{t|t ≥ T − ¯ x,t ∈ N}. That is, t′ is the lowest natural number for which ˆ Ct′+1,i ≤
ˆ CT−` x,i. Hence, from Lemma 2,
ˆ Ct′,i > ˆ CT−` x,i. (66)
From before we know that players invest eﬀort for all periods t ≥ t′. Hence, Ct′,i =
ˆ Ct′,i. Together with (61) and (66) this implies that
p(z − Ct′,i) < 1. (67)45
Hence, players do not invest in period t′ − 1. From Lemma 2 we know that the
continuation payoﬀ is nonincreasing in t. Hence, players do not invest eﬀort in periods
t < T − ¯ x. ￿
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dn < 0 when z is ﬁxed.
We ﬁx Z and assume that Assumption 1 remains valid. With ﬁxed Z d¯ x/dn < 0
follows from d¯ x/dn < 0 when ﬁxing z and that d¯ x/ − dz < 0. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
From Proposition 3, players only invest in the last ˘ T period(s), where ˘ T := #{t|T ≥
t ≥ T − ¯ x,t ≥ 1}. Therefore, the likelihood that the task is solved during the whole
game is
1 − (1 − np)
˘ T. (70)
This probability is bounded away from 1 even when T is large.
In contrast, a single player always invests, see Proposition 2. The likelihood that
the task is solved during the whole game is
1 − (1 − p)
T. (71)46
Therefore, when T is suﬃciently large, the probability of solving the task sometimes
is strictly higher for n = 1 than with n ≥ 2; compare (70) and (71).
When T is suﬃciently small, for example when T = 1, then n ≥ 2 players more
likely solve the task than a single player; compare again (70) and (71). ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
We only have to slightly adjust the proof of Proposition 1 by replacing the equality
in (60) by an inequality:
 
N
Ct,i = etpZ +(1−etp)δ
 
N




The arguments concerning the weighted average must then be slightly adjusted to
say that
 
N Ct,i is lower than the weighted average of Z − 1/p and
 
N Ct+1,i. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
The ﬁrst part follows directly from the ﬁndings that with δ < 1 instead of δ = 1
(i) each player is more eager to invest when Ct+1,i is stable or is lower when δ < 1
instead of δ = 1, see (13) and (ii) for a given eﬀort proﬁle (e1,...,eT), Ct+1,i is lower
for δ < 1 than when δ = 1, see (11).
The second part of the proposition follows from (13): when δ → 0, players always
invest eﬀort; for δ = 1 this is not necessarily true, cf. Proposition 3. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Because all players choose the same investment in every period, Proposition 6 implies
that Ct+1,i ≤ ˆ Ct+1,i. From (12) we know that ˆ Ct+1,i < (npz−1) 1
1−δ(1−np) for any ﬁnite
T. Hence, Ct+1,i < (npz − 1) 1
1−δ(1−np) for any ﬁnite T.
Plugging Ct+1,i = (npz − 1) 1
1−δ(1−np) into (13) yields
p(z − (npz − 1)
1




¯ δ solves this with equality.
For a given eﬀort proﬁle (e1,...,eT) the continuation payoﬀ is lower when δ de-
creases, see (11), and for a lower δ and a lower continuation payoﬀ (13) is more likely47
satisﬁed. Hence, when δ ≤ ¯ δ then all players always invest eﬀort. While for δ > ¯ δ
and T suﬃciently large it cannot hold that all players always invest because then,
due to ˆ Ct,i → (npz − 1) 1
1−δ(1−np), (13) is violated. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Whether a player invests or not is determined by (13). Suppose there is no discount-
ing. Because all players choose the same investment in every period, there are only
T formulas to consider (one formula in every period). Generically, no such formula
holds with equality, i.e., generically a player is never indiﬀerent. Suppose now that
there is discounting. Formulas that hold with > for δ = 1 also hold with > with δ
close to 1. The same is true for formulas which hold with <. Hence, for δ ∈ (` δ,1)
the players’ investments are the same with discounting than without. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
Also with β−δ preferences the continuation payoﬀs are given by (11) and (12). What
changes is player i’s invest rule, see (16).




ˆ Ct+1,i = (npz − 1)
1
1 − δ(1 − np)
. (74)
Plugging this into (16) yields
p
 
z − βδ(npz − 1)
1
1 − δ(1 − np)
 
≥ 1 (75)
This is solved with equality for β = ¯ β. From (16) we see that players always invest
when β ≤ ¯ β.
While for β > ¯ β and T suﬃciently large it cannot hold that all players always
invest because then, due to ˆ Ct,i → (npz − 1) 1
1−δ(1−np), (16) is violated. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11
From the proof of Proposition 3 we know that the equal-sharing contract wS
t,i = Z/n
and wF
t,i = 0 implements the ﬁrst-best if and only if for all t ∈ {1,...,T}
p(z − ˆ Ct+1,i) ≥ 1. (76)48
Suppose, contrary to our claim, that there exists a wage contract (wS,wF) which
implements the ﬁrst-best when it is not implementable with the equal-sharing con-



























Because all players always invest and the budget is balanced,
 
N
Ct+1,i/n = ˆ Ct+1,i. (79)
Hence, (78) gets
p(z − ˆ Ct+1,i) ≥ 1. (80)
Because (80) coincides with (76), (80) cannot hold for all t ∈ {1,...,T} when (76)
does not. A contradiction.
The second part of the proposition directly follows from Proposition 3. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13
Part 1. We claim that a necessary condition that another contract (wS,wF) is better
than the handsome contract is that in more periods all players invest.
With the handsome contract n−1 players invest in the early periods and n in the
late periods. That is, the eﬀort proﬁle is (e1 = n−1,...,et−1 = n−1,et = n,...,eT =
n), with t = min{t ∈ N : t ≥ T − ¯ x}.
Suppose e′
τ = n−1 and e′
τ+1 = n for an eﬀort proﬁle and e′′
τ = n and e′′
τ+1 = n−1
for an alternatively one. All other eﬀort levels are the same: e′
t = e′′
t for all t  = τ,τ+1.
Hence,
 



















τ,i = npZ − n + (1 − np)
 





















τ,i. Because before period
τ e′
t = e′′







These arguments can be repeated for any type of permutation of the eﬀort proﬁle
(e1 = n − 1,...,et−1 = n − 1,et = n,...,eT = n). Hence, a necessary condition that
another contract (wS,wF) is better than the handsome contract is that in more
periods all players invest.
Part 2. Denote by #t the number of periods from t until T in which all players
invest. Denote the number of periods in which all players invest with the equal-
sharing contract from period 1 to T by #ES. For the contract (wS,wF) to be better
than the handsome contract, we know by Part 1 that the contract must induce in
more periods investments of all players than the handsome contract: #1 > #ES.
Denote the period in which for the contract (wS,wF) we have #t = #ES + 1 by ˜ t.
We claim that
 
N ˆ CT−#ES+1,i is a lower bound for
 
N C˜ t+1,i. Because additional
eﬀort is beneﬁcial for the team’s expected payoﬀ, see Proposition 1, we get the fol-
lowing insight. For any eﬀort proﬁle (e˜ t+1,...,es,...,eT) for which there exists an es
which is 0 < es < n, with s ∈ [˜ t + 1,T], the team’s expected payoﬀ
 
N C˜ t+1,i is
higher than for the eﬀort proﬁle (e˜ t+1,...,es = 0,...,eT). When we want to minimize
 






ˆ CT−#˜ t+1+1,i, (83)




N Ct+1,i when no player invests in a period t,
see (23). Plugging in #˜ t+1 = #ES establishes that
 




Part 3. Because all players are required to invest in period ˜ t with the contract





˜ t,i − w
F
˜ t,i − C˜ t+1,i
 
≥ 1, (84)




C˜ t+1,i) ≥ n. (85)
From Part 2 we know that
 
N ˆ CT−#ES+1,i is a lower bound for
 





ˆ CT−#ES+1,i) ≥ n (86)
must hold. Dividing (86) by n yields
p(z − ˆ CT−#ES+1,i) ≥ 1, (87)
where we have used that ˆ Ct,i is the same for all players, see (3).
By the construction of ¯ x we have that with the equal-sharing contract all players
invest for t ≥ T − ¯ x and players do not invest before. Hence, for all periods t < T − ¯ x
p(z − ˆ Ct+1,i) < 1. (88)
With the equal-sharing contract all players invest from only t until T. So that the
number of periods for which all players invest indeed coincides with #ES we must
have
T − t + 1 = #
ES ⇐⇒ t = T − #
ES + 1. (89)
Because players do not invest with the equal-sharing contract in period t = t−1, we
must have that, using (88) and (89),
p(z − ˆ CT−#ES+1,i) < 1. (90)
Hence, (87) cannot hold. A contradiction. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 14
Consider two diﬀerent periods and two diﬀerent time limits: (i) the team’s expected
payoﬀ in period t′ with a time limit T ′ is
 
N CT=T′
t′,i ; (ii) with t′′ = t′−t′+1 = 1 and
T ′′ = T ′−t′+1 it is
 
N CT=T′′
1,i . Suppose that in both cases the team uses a handsome






1,i . By Proposition 13 the
handsome contract is second-best and so
 
N CT=T′′
1,i is maximized. Hence, when the
team is in period t′ and the time limit is T ′ it cannot renegotiate to yield a higher
expected payoﬀ for the team than with the handsome contract. This proves that the
handsome contract is renegotiation-proof.
To prove the second part of the proposition, suppose, contrary to our claim,
that there is another renegotiation-proof contract (wS′,wF ′) which is second-best51
and implements another eﬀort proﬁle e = (e1,...,et,...,eT). Because the handsome
contract is also second-best and it induces investment by all players in the late periods
t ≥ T − ¯ x, the contract (wS′,wF ′) must induce more investment in the early periods
and less in the late periods. Otherwise, the contract (wS′,wF ′) and the handsome
contract cannot both be second-best or both contracts would induce the same eﬀort
proﬁle. Given the contract (wS′,wF ′), once the ﬁrst period with t ≥ T −¯ x is reached,
the team can renegotiate the wage contract to the handsome contract (which induces
equal sharing in the remaining periods). Renegotiating the wage contract induces
a higher expected payoﬀ for the team, because more players invest eﬀort is some
period(s) s ≥ t, cf. Proposition 1. Hence, the team can make transfers so that all
players are better oﬀ due to renegotiation. This proves that the alternative contract
(wS′,wF ′) is not renegotiation-proof. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 16
Consider the following contract. For all periods and players wF
t,i = 0. In the late
periods t ≥ T − ¯ x, use the equal-sharing contract: wS
t,i = Z/2. In the early periods
t < T − ¯ x, use the alternating contract wS
t,1 = Z and wS
t,2 = 0 for t even and wS
t,1 = 0
and wS
t,2 = Z for t uneven.
We now prove that this contract implements the second-best. In the late periods,
all players invest because in this periods the equal-sharing contract is used as in the
handsome contract, which implements the second-best; see Proposition 13.
Before we look at the early periods we have to restrict the continuation payoﬀs. It
is useful to compare the two-player problem with the problem of a single player who
faces the same parameter constellation. Observe that Cn=1
T,1 = pZ −1 = 2pZ/2−1 =
Cn=2
T,i . If period t < T is a late period we have for the single-player problem
C
n=1
t,1 = pZ + (1 − p)C
n=1
t+1,1 − 1 (91)
and for the two-player problem
C
n=2
t,i = 2pZ/2 + (1 − 2p)C
n=2
t+1,i − 1 = pZ + (1 − 2p)C
n=2
t+1,i − 1. (92)
Because Cn=2
T,i ≤ Cn=1
T,1 , (91) and (92) imply that Cn=2
T−1,i ≤ Cn=1
T−1,1. Repeating the
arguments leads to the conclusion that in all late periods Cn=2
t,i ≤ Cn=1
t,1 .52
We next look at the latest early period, called ˜ t. Player j is induced to invest
eﬀort while player −j is not. Player j invests eﬀort in this period if and only if, see
(20) and recall that wS
˜ t,j = Z and wF
















Because we know from above that Cn=2
˜ t+1,j ≤ Cn=1
˜ t+1,1, (93) has to be satisﬁed, too.
Consider next the period ˜ t−1, where player −j should invest eﬀort and wS
˜ t−1,−j =
Z and wF
˜ t−1,−j = 0. Because player j may have success in period ˜ t, it holds that
Cn=2
˜ t,−j < Cn=2
˜ t+1,j. Therefore, the arguments from above can be repeated to show that
player −j invests eﬀort in period ˜ t − 1. More generally, when player j invests eﬀort
in an early period t, player −j also invests eﬀort in period t − 1.
Consider next the period ˜ t − 2. It holds that player j’s continuation payoﬀ of
reaching the next period ˜ t − 1 is lower than the one of a single player:
C
n=2
˜ t−1,j = (1 − p)C
n=2
˜ t,j = (1 − p)
 




≤ pZ − 1 + (1 − p)
 




= pZ − 1 + (1 − p)C
n=1
˜ t,1 = C
n=1
˜ t−1,1, (95)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from wS
˜ t−1,j = wF
˜ t−1,j = 0 and that only player −j
invests eﬀort in period ˜ t−1. The second equality uses that wS
˜ t,j = Z and wF
˜ t,j = 0 and
that only player j invests eﬀort in period ˜ t. The inequality follows from our above
ﬁnding that Cn=2
˜ t+1,j ≤ Cn=1
˜ t+1,1 and that pZ ≥ 1.
Because the single player invests in period ˜ t − 2, we have
p(Z − C
n=1
˜ t−1,1) ≥ 1. (96)
Because Cn=2
˜ t−1,j ≤ Cn=1
˜ t−1,1, also player j invests in period ˜ t − 2:
p(Z − C
n=2
˜ t−1,j) ≥ 1. (97)
The arguments can be repeated to show that j will invest in periods ˜ t − 4,˜ t − 6,... .
Trivially, a player i for whom wS
t,i = wF
t,i = 0 does not invest eﬀort in period t.
This proves the desired result. ￿53
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 17
Part 1. We suppose that the second-best is implemented and let T be large. We




t,i is constant and where
 
N wS
t,i ≤ Z. We want to set wages
wS
t,i as low as possible and obtain minimal continuation payoﬀs.
Consider some t which is far away from T. Then in the second-best n−1 players
invest eﬀort. For a player i who invests eﬀort in t we set the lowest possible wage,







Player i’s Bellman equation is
Ct,i = (n − 1)pw
S
t,i + (1 − (n − 1)p)Ct+1,i − 1, (99)
where we have used that wF
t,i = 0. Plugging (98) into (99) we get
Ct,i = n − 2 + Ct+1,i. (100)
There is also a player who does not invest eﬀort in t. We call her player j(t). For this
player the Bellman equation is, setting wS
t,j(t) as low as possible, namely wS
t,j(t) = 0,
Ct,j(t) = (1 − (n − 1)p)Ct+1,j(t). (101)
Summing over all players we get, using (100) and (101),
 
N
Ct,i = (n − 1)(n − 2) +
 
N
Ct+1,i − (n − 1)pCt+1,j(t). (102)





N Ct+1,i, where the failure gets arbitrarily small as T





where ε1 is arbitrarily small when T gets large.




− (n − 1)(n − 2) + ε2. (104)54
Part 2. When should which player not invest eﬀort? It is useful to deﬁne the
number of periods player i will invest eﬀort uninterruptedly from period t on by dt,i.
For example, when j(t) = i we have dt,i = 0, when j(t)  = i and j(t + 1) = i then
dt,i = 1, and so on. Then we get from (100) that
Ct,i = dt,i(n − 2) + Ct+dt,i,j(t+dt,i)=i. (105)
Note that due to limited liability continuation payoﬀs cannot be negative. Together
with
 
Ct,i < Z and (105) this implies that dt,i cannot be larger than Z/(n − 2);
otherwise Ct,i > Z.
Consider the problem of minimizing
 
Ct,i subject to (105) and that dt,i ≤ Z/(n−
2).
We claim that it is best to let in every period t until t + n − 1 another player
not invest eﬀort. We prove by contradiction. When there is another schedule which
is better, then there must be a player i′ who does not invest in eﬀort at least twice
between t and t + n − 1. Denote the period in which i′ does not invest eﬀort the
second time by t′. There is also a player with the highest value of dt,i (from above we
know that dt,i ≤ Z/(n − 2)) which we call player i′′. She invests eﬀort from t until
t + dt,i′′ − 1, and does not invest in period t + dt,i′′. From (105) we get that
Ct,i′′ = dt,i′′(n − 2) + Ct+dt,i′′,j(t+dt,i′′)=i′′. (106)
If we change the schedule and let player i′′ not invest in period t′ then we get
Ct,i′′ = (t
′ − t)(n − 2) + Ct′,j(t′)=i′′. (107)
From (104) we see that Ct,j(t) is approximately constant for periods t until t + dt,i′.
Hence,
(t
′ − t)(n − 2) + Ct′,j(t′)=i′′ < dt,i′′(n − 2) + Ct+dt,i′′,j(t+dt,i′′)=i′′. (108)
Because for all other players of (105) is left unchanged,
 
N Ct,i is not minimized. A
contradiction.
Part 3. If in every period t until t + n − 1 another player does not invest eﬀort55
then we get from (105) that
 
N




= nCt,j(t) + (n − 2)(0 + 1 + ... + (n − 1)) + ε3




where ε3 is arbitrarily small when T gets large.
Part 4. Plugging (104) into (109) yields
 
N
Ct,i = n(n − 2)/p − n(n − 1)(n − 2)/2 + ε4. (110)
Proposition 1 and (3) imply that
 
N Ct,i < Z − 1/p when
 
N wS




t,i ≤ Z. Hence, when
n(n − 2)/p − n(n − 1)(n − 2)/2 + ε4 ≥ Z − 1/p (111)
the second-best is not implementable when T is large. Rewriting (111), the second-
best with limited liability is not implementable with limited liability if T is suﬃciently
large and
Z < Z := n(n − 2)/p + 1/p − n(n − 1)(n − 2)/2. (112)
￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 18
The proof is constructive. We construct a time-independent and nondiscriminatory
wage contract: wS = wS
t,i and wF = wF
t,i for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ {1,...,T}. When a
player invests eﬀort in t, her expected payoﬀ in period t is zero when
npw
S + (1 − np)w
F − 1 = 0. (113)
When wages satisfy this for all periods, then Ct,i = 0 for all t ∈ {1,...,T},i ∈ N. To
induce always investment by all players we must have
p(w
S − w
F) ≥ 1. (114)
The wages wS and wF solve (113) and (114) and induce that all players always invest.
By choosing the appropriate transfer which the principal has to pay to the team,
the team can make sure that principal’s expected proﬁt is zero. Alternatively, one
can set the transfer equal to zero and adjust wS
1,i and wF
1,i accordingly. ￿56
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 20
Consider ﬁrst the case where Z′ = Z′′. With n′ players we have en=n′
t ≤ n′. With
n′′ players and when T is suﬃciently short, it is optimal for the team to use the
equal-sharing contract, see Proposition 11. Then et = n′′ for all t ∈ {1,...,T}. When
T is longer, then the ﬁrst-best cannot be implemented and the handsome contract is
second-best, see Proposition 13. It implements en=n′′
t = n′′ for periods t ≥ T − ¯ x and
en=n′′
t = n′′ − 1 for periods t < T − ¯ x.













Proposition 1 says that the team’s expected payoﬀ
 n′′
i=1 Ct,i is increasing in es for all
s ≥ t. From before we know that en=n′′
s ≥ en=n′′
s for all periods and en=n′′
s > en=n′′
t for











From (24) we see that for a given eﬀort proﬁle e = (e1,...,et,...,eT) the team’s
expected payoﬀ
 n′′
i=1 Ct,i is increasing in Z. From Proposition 4 we know that
d¯ x/dz > 0, which implies that for a higher Z an eﬀort proﬁle with weakly more
team eﬀort et in every period can be implemented. Both eﬀects imply that a team’s
expected payoﬀ is increasing in Z. Hence, for all Z′′ > Z′ (116) holds. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 21
Part 1. For φ = 1, condition (43) gets
np(z − Ct+1,i) ≥ 1, (117)
where we have used that the continuation payoﬀ is the same for all players. From
Lemma 2 we know that Ct+1,i ≤ ˆ Ct+1,i. Moreover, for any ﬁnite T, ˆ Ct+1,i is lower











(117) always holds. Hence, all players always invest eﬀort.
Part 2. For φ < 1, (43) gets
p(1 + φ(n − 1))(z − Ct+1,i) ≥ 1. (119)
When all players always invest, Ct+1,i is arbitrarily close to limT→∞ ˆ Ct+1,i = z − 1
np
when T is suﬃciently large. Because









1 + φ(n − 1)
n
< 1, (120)
it cannot hold that all players always invest when T is suﬃciently large.
Part 3. Let ` x(φ) solve (119):
p(1 + φ(n − 1))
 
z − ˆ CT−` x(φ),i
 
! = 1. (121)
Because ˆ CT−` x(φ),i is increasing in ` x(φ), see (3), we get that ` x(φ) is increasing in φ.
Deﬁne ¯ x(φ) := ` x(φ) + 1. By the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3
we get that when the time limit is suﬃciently short, namely T ≤ ¯ x(φ) + 1, then
players always invest eﬀort and that when the time limit is suﬃciently long, namely
T > ¯ x(φ) + 1, then players do not invest eﬀort in periods t < T − ¯ x(φ) and invest
eﬀort in the periods t ≥ T − ¯ x(φ). ￿
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Start with the case φi,φ−i = 0. Ct(0,0),i > z − 1/p; otherwise player i would invest
in t(0,0) − 1. Moreover, Ct(0,0)+1,i ≤ z − 1/p, otherwise player i would not invest in
period t(0,0). Because t(0,φ−i) ≥ t(¯ φ,φ−i), all players invest from period t(0,0) to
T we get then with (43) and (3) that
ˆ Ct(0,0),i = (npz − 1)
1 − (1 − np)T−t(0,0)+1
np
> z − 1/p (122)
and
ˆ Ct(0,0)+1,i = (npz − 1)
1 − (1 − np)T−t(0,0)
np
≤ z − 1/p. (123)
Next consider the case φi = 0 and φ−i = ¯ φ. Because t(0,φ−i) ≥ t(¯ φ,φ−i), all
players invest from period t(0, ¯ φ) to T. We must have
ˆ Ct(0,¯ φ),i = (npz − 1)
1 − (1 − np)T−t(0,¯ φ)+1
np
> z − 1/p. (124)58
and
ˆ Ct(0,¯ φ)+1,i = (npz − 1)
1 − (1 − np)T−t(0,¯ φ)
np
≤ z − 1/p. (125)
Comparing (122)-(125) yields that we must have t(0,0) = t(0, ¯ φ).
Finally, consider the remaining cases where φi = ¯ φ. By (43) it must hold that
p
 
z + ¯ φz − Ct+1,i − ¯ φCt+1,−i
 
≥ 1 (126)
for all t ≥ t(¯ φ, ¯ φ). Similarly,
p
 
z + ¯ φz − Ct+1,i − ¯ φCt+1,−i
 
≥ 1 (127)
for all t ≥ t(¯ φ,0).
For the case φi = φ−i = ¯ φ all players invest from period t(¯ φ, ¯ φ) until T. Hence,
Ct(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1,i + ¯ φCt(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1,−i = (1 + ¯ φ) ˆ Ct(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1,i. (128)
When φi = ¯ φ and φ−i = 0 we get that
Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i + ¯ φCt(¯ φ,0)+1,−i = (1 − ¯ φ)Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i + ¯ φ
 
Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i + Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,−i
 
≤ (1−¯ φ)Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i+¯ φ2 ˆ Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i ≤ (1−¯ φ) ˆ Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i+¯ φ2 ˆ Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i = (1+¯ φ) ˆ Ct(¯ φ,0)+1,i,
(129)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the ﬁnding that in the ﬁrst-best, i.e., where
continuation payoﬀs are maximized, all players always invest eﬀort. The second
inequality follows from t(0,φ−i) ≥ t(¯ φ,φ−i) and the fact that player i is better oﬀ
when player −i invests than when not (player i invests from period t(¯ φ,0) on until
T, while this is not necessarily true for player −i).
From (128) and (129) and the ﬁnding that ˆ Ct+1,i is decreasing in t it follows that
whenever (126) holds for t, (127) has to hold, too. Hence, t(¯ φ,0) ≤ t(¯ φ, ¯ φ). ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 22
With homogenous teams their is one team with selﬁsh players. This teams’ aggregated
expected payoﬀ is, using (3),
2 ˆ Ct(0,0),i = 2(2pz − 1)
1 − (1 − 2p)T−t(0,0)+1
2p
. (130)59
For the team with the social players we have
2 ˆ Ct(¯ φ,¯ φ),i = 2(2pz − 1)
1 − (1 − 2p)T−t(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1
2p
. (131)
When there are heterogenous teams, the each team’s expected payoﬀ is, using (2),
(2pz − 1)
1 − (1 − p)t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)
p
+ (1 − p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)2 ˆ Ct(0,0),i, (132)
where the ﬁrst part is the team’s expected payoﬀ from periodst(¯ φ, ¯ φ) until the period
before t(0, ¯ φ) = t(0,0). This part diminishes when t(¯ φ, ¯ φ) = t(0,0). The second part
is the teams’ expected payoﬀ from period t(0, ¯ φ) = t(0,0) until T, where we have
taken into account that this period is reached only with probability (1−p)t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0).
We claim that having two heterogenous teams lead to a weakly higher aggregated
expected payoﬀ than having one team with selﬁsh players and one with social players:
(4pz − 2)
1 − (1 − p)t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)
p
+ 2(1 − p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)(4pz − 2)
1 − (1 − 2p)T−t(0,0)+1
2p
≥ (4pz − 2)
1 − (1 − 2p)T−t(0,0)+1
2p
+ (4pz − 2)
1 − (1 − 2p)T−t(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1
2p
. (133)
Dividing by (4pz − 2) and multiplying by 2p yields
2
 
1 − (1 − p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)
 
+ 2(1 − p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)  
1 − (1 − 2p)
T−t(0,0)+1 
≥ 1 − (1 − 2p)
T−t(0,0)+1 + 1 − (1 − 2p)
T−t(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1. (134)
After simplifying and multiplying by −1 we get
2(1 − p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0)(1 − 2p)
T−t(0,0)+1 ≤ (1 − 2p)
T−t(0,0)+1 + (1 − 2p)
T−t(¯ φ,¯ φ)+1. (135)
Dividing by (1 − 2p)T−t(0,0)+1 yields
2(1 − p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0) ≤ 1 + (1 − 2p)
t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,¯ φ). (136)
For t(0,0) − t(¯ φ,0) = 0 or t(0,0) − t(¯ φ,0) = 1 this formula holds with equality.
Because t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0) ≥ 0, it remains to check that it holds for t(0,0)−t(¯ φ,0) ≥ 2.
It is useful to deﬁne g(p) = (1 − p)ζ. For ζ ≥ 2 this function is convex in p for
p ∈ [0,1]. By convexity we have
g(p) ≤
g(p + ν) + g(p − ν)
2
(137)60
for all ν that satisfy p + ν,p − ν ∈ [0,1]. Hence, also
2g(p) ≤ g(2p) + g(0). (138)
Substituting t(0,0) − t(¯ φ, ¯ φ) for ζ proves the desired result. ￿
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The ﬁrst-best maximizes
 
N Ct,j. We claim that in the ﬁrst-best all players choose
the same eﬀort level in a period. Suppose not. Then there exist et,j  = et,i. When









k(et,j) + k(et,i) due to k′′ > 0.
Note that Ct+1,j = Ct+1 for all j ∈ N because all players choose the same in-












From (BELLMAN) we see that maxet Ct is increasing in Ct+1. Hence, to maximize
Ct we also maximize Ct+1. In period t we maximize Ct, see (139), over (et,et+1,...),
in period t + 1 we maximize Ct+1 over (et+1,et+2,...). So the problem is always the
same and hence Ct is maximized when always the same eﬀort e is chosen. That is, in





1 − δ + δneFB , (140)
where eFB = argmax
nez−k(e)
1−δ+δne. ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 23
It is useful to write the C which satisﬁes (B SMPE) as a function CB(e,n), where
B stands for the Bellman equation. Similarly, we write CIC(e) for the valuation C
satisfying (IC SMPE).
Existence. We ﬁrst proof existence. Essentially, we want to show that CB(e) and
CIC(e) evolve like in Figure 3, where the functions CB(e,n) and CIC(e) cross at least
once.61




(1 + δ − δne)2
2δn
− z(n − 1)(1 − δ) − (n − 1)δc < 0. (141)
Because CB(0,n) = 0, dCB(0,n)/de > 0, CB(e,n) ≤ 0 for e suﬃciently large, and
dCB(e,n)2/de2 < 0, see (141), we know that CB(e,n) is inverted-U shaped in e and
has a maximum at some e > 0, but no minimum. Moreover, CB(e,n) ≥ 0 if and only
if e ∈ [0, ¯ eB(n)], where ¯ eB(n) is implicitly deﬁned by the e > 0 which solves
n¯ eB(n)z = k(¯ eB(n)). (142)







Moreover, CIC(e) ≥ 0 if and only if e ≤ ¯ eIC, where ¯ eIC is implicitly deﬁned by
z = k
′(¯ eIC). (144)
We get from (142) and (144) that
k(¯ eB(n))
n¯ eB(n)
= z = k
′(¯ eIC). (145)
Because k(e)/e < k′(e), k(e)/e and k′(e) are increasing in e, n ≥ 1, we must have
¯ eB(n) > ¯ eIC.
Observe that CB(e,n) and CIC(e) are continuous in e and CB(0,n) = 0 < z/δ =
CIC(0). Together with the insights from before it follows that CB(e) and CIC(e) cross
at least once. That is, there exists a e such that CB(e,n) = CIC(e).
We have to check that for an e which solves CB(e,n) = CIC(e) the present value






′′(et,i) < 0. (146)
Hence, the second-order condition is satisﬁed. Therefore, when e solves CB(e,n) =
CIC(e) we have a maximum and no minimum. Hence, a MPE always exists.
Uniqueness. Next we prove uniqueness. We want to show that CIC(e) and
CB(e,n) only intersect once, as in Figure 4.62
0 e
C




For n = 1 the eﬀort level e which solves CB(e,1) = CIC(e) is the one that
maximizes CB(e,1): eFB(1) = argmaxeCB(e,1). Because d2CB(e,n)/de2 < 0, it
follows that CB(e,1) has no other extreme point. Consequently, CB(e,1) = CIC(e) is
only solved by eFB(1) and no other e. That is, the MPE is unique when n = 1.
For more players (n > 1) we get that, given some e > 0,
dCB(e,n)
dn
∝ z(1 − δ) + δk(e) > 0. (147)





∝ nz − δnz − k
′(e)(1 − δ + δne) + k(e)δn, (148)
eFB(n) is implicitly deﬁned by
nz − δnz − k
′(e
FB(n))(1 − δ + δne
FB(n)) + k(e
FB(n))δn = 0. (149)




z − δz − k′(eFB(n))δeFB(n) + k(eFB(n))δ
−k′′(eFB(n))(1 − δ + δneFB(n))
∝ z(1 − δ)
2 + k(e
FB(n))δ(1 − δ) > 0,
where we have used the ﬁrst-order condition k′(eFB(n)) = nz − nδC.63
We have that dCB(e,n)/de > 0 for all e < eFB(n). Because deFB(n)/dn > 0, for
n > 1, we get that dCB(e,n)/de > 0 for all e ≤ eFB(1). Therefore, CB(n) and CIC(n)
cross only once for e ∈ [0,eFB(1)]. Because (i) CB(e,1) and CIC(e) do not cross for
any e > eFB(1) and (ii) CB(e,n) > CB(e,1) for all n > 1, also CB(e,n) and CIC(e)
do not cross for any e > eFB(1). Hence, also for n > 1 the SMPE is unique. This is






eFB(1) eFB(n > 1) e
Figure 4: Uniqueness.
￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 24
We again write CB(e,n) for the C which satisﬁes (B SMPE) and CIC(e) for the C
satisfying (IC SMPE).
The results follow from, see especially the proof of Lemma 23, that (i) CB(e) is
inverted-U shaped in e, (ii) CB(e) is increasing in n for all e > 0, (iii) CIC(e) is
decreasing in e but constant in n, (iv) eFB is the SMPE with n = 1, and (v) eFB
is increasing in n. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which is in the main part of the
paper. ￿64
APPENDIX B: SYMMETRIC NON-MPE AND
ASYMMETRIC MPE
In our model, players are symmetric and play every period the same game. Nonethe-
less, there may exist non-Markov perfect equilibria where players choose symmetric
investments as well as Markov perfect equilibria where players choose asymmetric
investments. The following examples are instructive.
SYMMETRIC NON-MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIA





(1 − ε)e , for e ∈ [0,0.1],
(1 − ε) + (1 + ε)e, for e ∈ (0.1,0,2],
∞ , otherwise.





0.2, for t uneven,
0 , for t even.
Suppose that this is an equilibrium. Then
Cuneven = 0.4 × z + 0.6 × 0.5 × Ceven − 0.2 (150)
and
Ceven = 0.5 × Cuneven. (151)
Inserting the latter in the former equation we get
Cuneven =





0.4 × z − 0.2
1.7
. (153)
To prove that this is an equilibrium we have to check the incentive constraints. When
t is uneven we need
z − 0.5 × Ceven ≥ 1 + ε ⇐⇒ z −
0.4 × z − 0.2
3.4
≥ 1 + ε (154)65
and when t is even
z − 0.5 × Cuneven ≤ 1 − ε ⇐⇒ z −
0.4 × z − 0.2
1.7
≤ 1 − ε. (155)
Hence, for z ∈ (16/15,15/13) and ε suﬃciently small, both incentive constraints are
satisﬁed. Intuitively, in uneven periods players do not invest because the continuation
payoﬀ of reaching the next period is high and the continuation payoﬀ of even periods
is high because players invest a lot of eﬀort. The intuition for why there is high
investment in even periods is vice versa.
Interestingly, players may be better oﬀ by playing a non-Markov perfect equilib-
rium than by playing a Markov perfect equilibrium. For example, when z = 1.1 and
ε = 0.02 then Cuneven ≈ 0.282 and Ceven ≈ 0.141. In the SMPE we have eSMPE = 0.1
and CSMPE ≈ 0.203. So at the beginning of the ﬁrst period players prefer to coor-
dinate on playing the non-Markov perfect equilibrium than on playing the SMPE.
This is intuitive: in period 1, players invest much more in the non-Markov perfect
equilibrium than in the SMPE. Therefore, from the perspective of period 1, their
expected payoﬀ is higher in the non-Markov perfect equilibrium than in the SMPE.
ASYMMETRIC MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIA





e , for e ≤ 0.5,
∞, otherwise.



















It remains to check that the players’ incentive constraints are satisﬁed. We need to
have
z − 0.5 ×
2
3
z ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ z ≤ 3/2 (158)
and








≥ 1 ⇐⇒ z ≥ 1. (159)66
Hence, for z ∈ [1,1.5] et,1 = 0 and et,2 = 0.5 is a MPE.
The intuition is that because player 1 invests no eﬀort her continuation payoﬀ
Ct,1 is much higher than the one of player 2, Ct,2, who spends eﬀort. Given this,
player 1 has no incentive to invest in t or in subsequent periods, whereas player 2 has
incentives to invest eﬀort.
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